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Although determinants of cross-border merger and acquisitions (M&As) have been given 
substantial attention in the literature, research examining the effect of tax system characteristics 
on cross-border M&As is more limited.  Cross-border M&As have substantial tax implications 
for both the acquiring firm and the target firm.  Because firms evaluate investments based on 
expected after-tax returns, I expect that managers consider potential tax savings or costs in 
making investment decisions across tax jurisdictions. In this study, I use hand-collected country-
year-level tax system characteristics to examine tax determinants of the volume and direction of 
cross-border M&As.  I find that tax system characteristics such as controlled foreign corporation 
provisions, thin capitalization provisions, and the presence of a worldwide versus territorial 
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“Over the past four years…Valeant has managed to acquire a slew of U.S. companies worth 
more than $30 billion.  The Subcommittee reviewed key deal documents to understand how tax 
advantages affected Valeant’s three largest acquisitions to date, including the 2013 sale of New 
York-based eye care firm Bausch & Lomb and the 2015 sale of North Carolina-based drug 
maker Salix.  We learned that in those two transactions alone, Valeant determined it could shave 
more than $3 billion off the target company’s [sic] tax bills by integrating them into the 
Canadian-based corporate group. Those tax savings meant that Valeant’s investments in its 
American targets would have higher returns and pay for themselves more quickly– two key 
drivers, of course, of any acquisition.”    - Senator Rob Portman,  
      Senate Subcommittee on Investigations Chairman 
 
1. Introduction 
Increasing globalization results in a growing number of cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions (M&As).  In 2017, JP Morgan’s 2018 Global M&A Outlook states that over 30% of 
total M&A activities were cross-border.  Unlike domestic M&As, cross-border M&As are 
subject to additional frictions caused by national boundaries, such as differences in currencies, 
language, culture, regulations, and macroeconomic factors.  Prior research provides evidence that 
many factors affect the volume and direction of cross-border M&As, including geographic 
distance, economic development, exchange rate and stock market returns (Erel et al. 2012), as 
well as accounting quality (Rossi and Volpin 2004).  However, M&As, and particularly cross-
border M&As, may have far-reaching tax implications for both the acquirer and the target.  In 




facilitate tax avoidance strategies such as advantageously shifting income or expatriating to a 
tax-preferred jurisdiction.   
In the U.S., much of the rhetoric surrounding tax reform suggests that U.S. multinational 
corporations may not be competitive in the global marketplace, including the market for foreign 
investments, such as M&A targets.  In July 2015, the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on 
Investigations conducted a hearing entitled “The effect of the U.S. Tax Code on the Market for 
Corporate Control and Jobs” in which senators interviewed CEOs and executives from 
companies that were affected by corporate inversions or foreign takeovers.  While an extensive 
literature examines corporate inversions, they are relatively rare.  Bloomberg’s Tax Inversion 
Tracker lists fifty-eight total corporate inversions between 1982 and 2017, inclusive.  Since 
2004, the Treasury Department has issued four broad sets of regulations to curb the practice, 
albeit with limited success.  However, in curbing corporate inversion practices, some have 
suggested that U.S. companies are now more vulnerable to foreign takeovers.  Consistent with 
this, the Senate Subcommittee found that the value of foreign takeovers of U.S. companies in 
2014 totaled $275 billion, double the amount for 2013.  A recent analysis by E&Y found that 
between 2004 and 2014, foreign buyers acquired $179B more of U.S. companies than U.S. 
companies acquired in foreign targets.  Anecdotally, Salix Pharmaceuticals, a North-Carolina 
based company, was in talks to complete an acquisition inversion in order to expatriate to Ireland 
in 2014.  However, the plans dissolved when the Treasury Department issued its second set of 
inversion restrictions in 2014.  The halt was lauded as a victory for the Treasury Department.  
However, only a few months later, Salix Pharmaceuticals was acquired by Canadian Valeant 




inversion in 2010 via a reverse-merger with Ontario-based Biovail, prior to the release of the 
Treasury Department’s second set of inversion restrictions.   
Despite the importance of tax considerations to cross-border M&A decisions, extant 
research on tax effects in cross-border M&A decisions is largely limited to broad tax system 
characteristics, such as statutory tax rates (Erel et al. 2012), double-taxation of dividends paid by 
foreign subsidiaries (Huizinga and Voget 2009), and the U.K.’s and Japan’s switches from  
worldwide to territorial regimes (Feld, Ruf, Scheuering, Schreiber and Voget 2013).  However, 
cross-border M&A activity presents opportunities for firms to engage in sophisticated tax 
avoidance, possibly even allowing them to change their tax residence, effectively altering the 
entire tax jurisdiction to which the post-M&A firm is subject.  Changes to the corporate structure 
caused by cross-border M&As can result in changes to the cost of operating the target, as well as 
changes to the cost of repatriating income from foreign subsidiaries to the acquirer.  For this 
reason, firms are likely to consider multiple tax system characteristics, rather than differences in 
corporate tax rates alone, in selecting and structuring cross-border M&As.  To improve our 
understanding of the impact that tax system characteristics have on cross-border M&A 
transactions, I examine multiple tax system characteristics, including worldwide and territorial 
regimes, Controlled Foreign Corporation (CFC) provisions, transfer pricing, thin capitalization 
regulations, double-taxation relief provisions, and favorable tax treatment of income derived 
from intellectual property (IP), in addition to differences in statutory tax rates on corporate 
income and both statutory and treaty withholding rates on dividends paid from the target to the 




I exploit variations in tax system characteristics across tax jurisdictions and over time to 
examine the impact of these characteristics on cross-border M&As.1  I use the E&Y Worldwide 
Corporate Tax Guides and the PwC Worldwide Tax Summaries for corporate taxes to hand-
collect tax system characteristics that I expect will influence after-tax returns to M&A 
transactions.2  If rational managers evaluate investment opportunities using expected after-tax 
returns, I expect that acquirers will evaluate potential target firms considering all possible tax 
costs or synergies that may result from cross-border M&As.  As a result, I expect that tax 
“synergies” created by differences in tax system characteristics across the acquiring and target 
firms’ countries will affect the flow of cross-border M&As between the two countries. 
Using a sample of 55,670 cross-border M&As across 50 countries between 2006 and 
2015, inclusive, I find evidence to suggest that a naïve tax variable, such as the difference in the 
statutory corporate income tax rate, does not fully explain tax effects on M&A decisions.  I find 
that tax system characteristics strongly influence the direction of cross-border M&A, while 
effects on the volume of M&A are more ambiguous.  Specifically, I find that, when firms from 
two countries with divergent tax treatments merge, the acquirer is more likely to have a higher 
statutory tax rate, but less likely to be subject to a worldwide tax regime, CFC provisions, or thin 
capitalization rules.  In addition, I find evidence that firms structure the direction of M&A to 
minimize dividend withholding taxes on the repatriation of profits from the target to the acquirer.    
                                                
1 SDC M&A database does not contain sufficient information to determine whether the acquired firm will be 
operated as a subsidiary or as a foreign branch of the acquiring firm, and the tax treatment of the post-M&A firm 
often differs according to this designation.  M&As more commonly result in subsidiary structures rather than branch 
structures (Huizinga and Voget 2009).  Therefore, in defining a country’s tax system characteristics, I consider the 
treatment of foreign-source income when the taxpayer is a corporation, the legal structure is a foreign subsidiary 
(not a foreign branch), and the income is from the active conduct of a business. 
2 I examine tax system characteristics relevant to the taxation of foreign-sourced income, profit-shifting, and 
avoidance of double-taxation, as well as withholding taxes payable upon transferring dividends across jurisdictions.  
I focus on these broad characteristics, rather than specific tax rules governing the determination of taxable income 
(i.e., depreciation rules or relief from losses), as they are likely to capture large changes to the tax treatment of a firm 





I also document that the effects of tax system characteristics on cross-border M&As differ when 
the acquirer is located in a worldwide tax regime than when the acquirer is located in a territorial 
tax regime, consistent with tax system characteristics imposing different costs across tax 
regimes.  In additional analyses, I examine the use of an intermediary firm in a third country and 
the proportion of cross-border M&As in which the acquirer gains control of the target firm (i.e. 
more than 50 percent owned).  I find evidence to suggest that cross-border M&A is more (less) 
likely to involve a third, intermediary country when the acquirer (target) is located in a 
worldwide regime and the target (acquirer) is located in a territorial regime.  I find strong 
evidence that the presence of CFC provisions in the acquirer country deters firms, not only in 
acquiring a target, but in obtaining control of a target.   
My study contributes to the body of research examining the determinants of cross-border 
investment decisions.  My study may also be of interest to legislators, as it contributes to our 
understanding of the potential effects of the recent U.S. tax reform, commonly known as “The 
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act.”3   Cross-border M&A activities both of and by U.S. companies, 
including those that result in expatriation of U.S. firms (i.e., corporate inversions), were 
frequently cited as evidence that the U.S. worldwide tax regime put U.S. multinational 
corporations at a functional disadvantage relative to their foreign counterparts.  Supporters of the 
tax reform state that the current U.S. tax system hinders U.S. firms’ ability to compete against 
similar firms based in lower-tax, territorial jurisdictions and cite U.S. corporate inversions and 
foreign acquirers targeting U.S. firms as evidence that the U.S. tax burden makes U.S. companies 
more valuable to foreign acquirers than to domestic acquirers.  My study contributes to this 
debate by empirically demonstrating that tax system characteristics have a significant impact on 
                                                
3 While commonly referred to as “The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act,” the bill is entitled “To provide for reconciliation 




a firm’s likelihood of investing abroad or likelihood of being acquired by a foreign firm.  My 
results suggest that CFC provisions and thin capitalization rules, both present in the U.S. tax 
system before and after the reform, may be stronger drivers of the direction of cross-border 
M&A than the presence of a worldwide tax system.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section two provides background 
and development of expectations, section three outlines the research methodology, section four 
discusses data sources and sample composition, section five presents primary results, section six 
presents supplemental tests, section seven presents additional analyses, and section eight 
concludes. 
 
2. Background and Development of Expectations 
Determinants of Cross-Border M&As 
Determinants of cross-border M&As have received meaningful attention in both the 
accounting and finance literatures.  Di Giovanni (2005) finds that domestic financial conditions, 
such as the size of the stock market relative to GDP, increases the number of foreign acquisitions 
made by firms within a country.  Rossi and Volpin (2004) find that firms are more likely to be 
targeted for M&As in countries with stronger investor protections and accounting quality, 
though, as a proportion of total M&As, cross-border M&As are less common in these countries.  
Within cross-border M&As, the authors find that acquirers are likely to be from countries with 
stronger investor protections than those in the target country, suggesting that corporate 
governance may be “imported” through the use of cross-border M&As.  Erel et al. (2012) 
examine several non-tax determinants of cross-border M&As, including country-level 




market returns.  They find that firms acquire more foreign subsidiaries in countries that are 
geographically close and culturally similar, as well as in countries that are already trading 
partners.  They also find that acquirers strategically acquire targets in response to valuation 
differences caused by differences in stock market and exchange rate returns, not as a result of 
pure financial arbitrage, but because valuation differences make cross-border M&As 
incrementally more desirable.  Though Erel et al. (2012) focus on non-tax determinants of cross-
border M&As, they also consider the influence of statutory tax rates on cross-border M&As.  
They find that firms are more likely to acquire targets in countries with a lower statutory 
corporate income tax rate, which provides some evidence that managers strategically consider 
tax costs in making cross-border M&A decisions.   
In addition to the findings in Erel et al. (2012), other studies examine the effect of 
statutory tax rates and broad tax reform on cross-border M&As.  Feld et al. (2013) examine 
foreign acquisitions by Japanese and British firms around the 2009 tax reforms which resulted in 
each country moving from a worldwide to a territorial regime.  They find that foreign 
acquisitions by Japanese and British firms increased following the reform, which they interpret 
as evidence that worldwide tax regimes reduce the competitiveness of firms in the international 
market for corporate control.  Huizinga and Voget (2009) examine 917 cross-border M&As 
between firms in European countries, Japan, and the United States that occurred from 1985 
through 2004.  For countries in their sample, the double tax burden on foreign profits repatriated 
to a parent firm is estimated as a function of the target country’s statutory corporate income tax 
rate, the acquirer country’s statutory corporate income tax rate, the withholding tax rate on 




profitability.4 The authors find that, as the rate of double tax liability increases, the likelihood 
that a firm acquires a target decreases, consistent with firms adopting an organization structure 
that minimizes their double tax liability.5  In an additional paper, the authors further examine 
double taxation’s impact on merger pricing, and find that the increased tax burden is fully 
capitalized into merger premiums, suggesting that the target firm’s shareholders bear the 
increased tax burden (Huizinga, Voget, and Wager 2012).   
 As discussed above, extant research on tax determinants of cross-border M&As has 
primarily examined the effect of statutory corporate income tax rates, despite evidence to suggest 
that other tax system characteristics are important determinants of expected returns.  However, 
this narrow focus ignores several meaningful tax characteristics that are also likely to influence 
foreign investment decisions, including cross-border M&As.  Atwood, Huston, and Wallace 
(2015) analytically model expected home country tax payable for multinational corporations 
based on home country characteristics (including statutory tax rates, withholding on dividends, 
CFC provisions, transfer pricing regulations, and foreign tax credits), and empirically test their 
effect on after-tax expected returns.  They find that these tax system characteristics influence 
                                                
4 Specifically, Huizinga and Voget (2009) estimate the rate of double-taxation as a function of the statutory 
corporate tax rates of both the parent and subsidiary countries, the withholding rate on dividends paid from the 
subsidiary country to the parent country, and the parent country’s method of providing relief from double-taxation 
(exemption or foreign tax credit).  For example, consider the case of a parent located in a worldwide system with an 
indirect Foreign Tax Credit with a nonbinding limit (i.e., tj < ti).  Let ti (tj) denote the statutory corporate tax rate for 
the subsidiary (parent) country and wi,j denote the withholding tax rate on dividends paid from the subsidiary 
country to the parent country.  For profits generated in the subsidiary country, the tax rate would equal ti. Following 
an acquisition by a firm in the parent country, profits generated by the subsidiary and repatriated to the parent would 
be taxed at ti+(1-ti)wi,j in the subsidiary country.  The dividend received by the parent company would be grossed up 
to its pre-tax value and taxed at tj, less the allowed foreign tax credit in the amount of ti+(1-ti)wi,j, resulting in a final 
effective tax rate for the repatriate foreign profits of tj.  The resulting rate of double taxation would be the difference 
in the two countries’ statutory corporate tax rates, tj- ti. For cases in which the parent is located in a territorial 
system, the rate of double-taxation is the rate of withholding on dividends, wi,j.  The authors then apply this rate to 
the proportion of the combined firm’s worldwide pre-tax income that is made up of the income from the subsidiary 
firm, implicitly assuming that all income of the subsidiary is repatriated to the parent firm. 
5 However, to the extent that relative profitability of the acquiring firm and target firm drive organizational structure, 




multinational firms’ after-tax ROA, which suggests that further exploration of the effects of tax 
system characteristics on cross-border M&As is warranted.  I include statutory corporate income 
tax rates as a potential determinant of cross-border M&As but I also examine other major tax 
system characteristics that determine the tax treatment of foreign-sourced income, including 
dividend withholding tax rates (determined under existing tax treaties, where relevant), 
worldwide versus territorial regimes, transfer pricing and thin capitalization regulations, CFC 
provisions, foreign tax credits and the presence of an IP box regime, allowed in both the target 
and acquiring firms’ countries.  I discuss each of these characteristics and their potential 
implications for cross-border M&As below. 
Differences in Statutory Tax Rates 
 Consistent with Erel et al. (2012), I consider the effect of the difference in the acquirer 
and target countries’ statutory corporate income tax rates on cross-border M&As; however, I 
expand this analysis by also looking at other factors contributing to the tax costs of repatriating 
income from a foreign target to the acquirer.  Using information on the location of terminal 
subsidiaries of U.S. multinational firms, along with the use of foreign holding companies, 
Dyreng, Lindsey, Markle, and Shackelford (2015) find evidence that U.S. multinationals 
consider the costs of repatriating dividends, as measured by dividend withholding tax rates, in 
selecting whether to use a foreign holding company, and, if so, where to locate it.  I expect that 
firms will consider withholding tax rates on dividends made between the acquirer and the target 
as a cost of operating the foreign subsidiary.  Therefore, I expect that, all else equal, acquirers 
will invest in foreign subsidiaries located in countries which have low rates of withholding on 




Worldwide and Territorial Regimes 
Tax systems are commonly separated into worldwide (credit) or territorial (exemption) systems.  
In a pure worldwide system, the foreign-sourced income of a domestic firm is effectively taxed 
at the higher of the domestic tax rate or the foreign tax rate, as foreign-sourced income, including 
profits of foreign subsidiaries, are includable in domestic taxable income and foreign taxes paid 
are generally allowed to be credited against domestic tax due on the same income.  In this way, a 
pure worldwide system exhibits capital export neutrality in that resident firms pay the same tax 
rate for their domestic and foreign income.  On the other hand, a pure territorial system exempts 
all foreign-sourced income from domestic taxation.  A pure territorial system exhibits capital 
import neutrality, as it will result in firms paying the rate of tax in the jurisdiction in which the 
income is sourced (Richman 1963; Musgrave 1969).  In reality, tax jurisdictions are not pure 
worldwide or pure territorial systems, and thus, exhibit neither capital export neutrality nor 
import neutrality.  Because an acquisition by a firm in a worldwide country subjects the target’s 
income to a second level of taxation in the acquirer country, I expect that firms in territorial 
regimes more frequently acquire foreign subsidiaries and are net acquirers in cross-border 
M&As. 
Controlled Foreign Corporation (CFC) Provisions 
Another common tax system characteristic that may impact cross-border M&A decisions 
are CFC provisions, which are used to prevent erosion of the domestic tax base.  While CFC 
provisions differ across tax regimes, the defining characteristic of CFC provisions is the 
immediate inclusion of foreign-source income of a “controlled” foreign subsidiary’s income in 
the parent’s domestic taxable income.6  In a territorial tax system, CFC provisions disallow the 
                                                
6 CFC provisions, such as the definition of control and the types of income that are includable in domestic taxable 




exclusion of certain foreign-source income; in a worldwide system, CFC provisions disallow the 
deferral privilege for that income.  CFC provisions present an additional tax cost to acquirers, as 
they cause a loss of deferral when the parent country has a worldwide regime and a loss of 
exemption when the parent country has a territorial regime.  As a result, acquirers in countries 
without CFC provisions will generate a higher after-tax rate of return from the acquisition of 
control of a foreign subsidiary.  Consistent with this theory, Markle and Robinson (2012) 
examine the effects of CFC provisions and worldwide versus territorial tax systems on the 
demand for tax haven operations.  They find that the presence and inclusiveness of CFC 
provisions in the parent firm’s country reduce the likelihood that a firm operates a subsidiary in a 
tax haven country.  In a concurrent working paper, Hagen and Prettl (2017) document that, when 
considering cross-border M&A that results in control of the target firm, the probability of being 
an acquirer of a low-tax target is lower when the acquirer is subject to CFC provisions.  Because 
the presence of CFC provisions in the acquirer country likely increase the costs of operating a 
foreign subsidiary, I expect that acquirers subject to CFC provisions will be less acquisitive, and 
that, given the opportunity to structure M&As such that the resulting firm will not be subject to 
CFC provisions, the acquirer is less likely to have CFC provisions than the target firm. 
Transfer Pricing and Thin Capitalization Regulations 
 Transfer pricing and thin capitalization regulations are anti-tax avoidance rules aimed at 
limiting profit shifting via transfer price manipulation and intra-company debt, respectively.  
Firms may manipulate intra-company transfer prices or intra-company debt to move income 
from high-tax to low-tax jurisdictions, reducing the firm’s overall tax burden.  However, tax 
authorities can limit this behavior with specific rules for the deductibility of intra-company 




between related parties must be determined at arms-length.  Consistent with firms considering 
profit-shifting opportunities in cross-border M&A decisions, Mescall and Klassen (2014) find 
that merger premia are reduced as transfer pricing risk from the target firm increases.7  Because 
parent firms can produce large tax savings by manipulating intra-company transactions with a 
subsidiary (or subsidiaries), the absence of provisions that limit manipulation of intra-company 
pricing or debt in either the parent or target firms’ country (the country with the highest tax 
burden) will likely decrease the cost of operating a foreign subsidiary.  Unlike transfer pricing 
regulations, which may be difficult for tax authorities to enforce due to the difficulty in defining 
arms-length values, thin capitalization rules are generally formulaic and, thus, are easier to 
enforce.   
Foreign Tax Credit 
  Next, I examine the allowance of foreign tax credits on non-exempt foreign-source 
income.  Generally speaking, relief from double-taxation of foreign income is provided through 
one of two means: exemption or credit.  These methods are roughly considered as equivalents to 
territorial and worldwide regimes, respectively.  However, tax systems rarely operate as a pure 
exemption or credit system.  As a result, even territorial tax systems may offer a foreign tax 
credit for foreign taxes paid on non-exempt income.  For example, the presence of a foreign tax 
credit could alleviate double-taxation when dividends paid by a foreign subsidiary are not 
eligible for a dividend participation exemption because the acquirer’s ownership in the 
subsidiary is below the participation threshold or the subsidiary’s tax rate is below the threshold 
                                                
7 Mescall and Klassen (2014) estimate the enforcement, severity, and clarity of transfer pricing rules across 33 
countries using survey responses from partners and managers in the transfer pricing divisions of two Big Four 
accounting firms.  In their specification, the authors consider only the transfer pricing risk of the target firm.  In my 
setting, I consider the presence of transfer pricing regulations at either the target or acquirer level.  As tax authorities 
are concerned with income being shifted away from their own jurisdiction, using transfer pricing rules at either the 
acquirer or target levels avoids making assumptions about the direction in which the post-merger firm would prefer 




for exemption in the acquirer country.  Because the foreign tax credit across all regimes applies 
only to non-exempt foreign income, the absence of a foreign tax credit should still impose a cost 
across both worldwide and territorial regimes.  As a result, this variable should be incrementally 
informative to the worldwide and territorial distinction discussed above.  I expect that the 
presence of a foreign tax credit in the parent country reduces the cost of operating a foreign 
subsidiary.  Therefore, I expect that acquirers in territorial countries that allow a foreign tax 
credit will be more acquisitive than acquirers in territorial countries that do not allow foreign tax 
credits.   
Intellectual Property Box Regimes 
  Finally, I examine the effect of preferential tax treatment of income derived from 
intellectual property, commonly referred to as an IP Box Regime.  To incentivize innovation, tax 
regulators have instituted rules to reduce the amount of income subject to tax or reduce the tax 
rate on income derived from qualifying IP.  Although not typically considered a primary 
determinant of the tax treatment of foreign-sourced income, the ease with which IP can be 
transferred to related parties in low-tax countries to facilitate tax-motivated profit-shifting could 
influence cross-border M&A.  Predictions on the effects of IP Box regimes are unclear ex-ante.  
The presence of an IP Box regime in the home country reduces the tax benefits of shifting 
income derived from qualifying IP to a foreign jurisdiction, which may dampen the cross-border 
M&A market in favor of domestic M&A.  This would result in reductions in the volume of 
cross-border M&A.  However, foreign acquirers in an IP Box regime may also be advantaged 
over other potential bidders in cross-border M&A transactions, particularly if the target has high 
levels of IP income that is currently not tax-preferred.  I expect that this effect is limited, 




acquired IP unless the IP is substantially further developed in the post-acquisition period.  
Similarly, for acquirers not located in IP Box regimes, firms in IP Box regimes may make 
attractive targets, as the acquirer may shift IP income to the target in order to participate in the 
tax-advantaged treatment. 
 
3. Research Methodology 
Determinants of the Volume of Cross-Border M&As 
 I examine the determinants of cross-border M&As using a regression adapted 
from Erel et al. (2012).  I define two dependent variables, CBMA_Volume and CBMA_Direction, 
to separately capture the volume of cross-border M&As that occur between an ordered country 
pair and the likelihood of being the acquirer country in cross-border M&A between a specific 
country pair, respectively.  These variables are composed similarly to the dependent variable in 
Erel et al. (2012), which is calculated by taking the number of cross-border acquisitions of firms 
in country i (the target country) by firms in country j (the acquirer country) for period t, and 
scaling it by the sum of the total number of cross-border M&As between the target country and 
the acquiring country and the total number of domestic mergers in the target country.  However, 
I deviate slightly from that composition in order to separately examine the volume and direction 
components.  CBMA_Volume is calculated as the number of cross-border acquisitions of firms in 
country i (the target country) by firms in country j (the acquirer country) for period t, scaled by 
the sum of the total number of domestic mergers in the target country and the acquirer country.8,9  
                                                
8 For example, for the Canada-U.S. 2009 observation, this measure is calculated as the number of acquisitions of 
U.S. targets by Canadian acquirers in 2009, scaled by the sum of the number of domestic mergers in the U.S. and the 
number of domestic mergers in Canada in 2009. 
9 The approach in Erel et al. (2012) would call for scaling this measure by only the number of domestic M&A in the 
target country.  I choose to scale, instead, by the sum of the domestic M&A markets in both countries for two 
reasons.  First, I seek to examine the decision of firms to acquire a foreign target rather than a domestic one.  




This measure captures the volume of targets in country i acquired by firms in country j relative to 
the size of the domestic M&A markets in both countries.  CBMA_Direction is calculated as the 
number of cross-border acquisitions of firms in country i (the target country) by firms in country 
j (the acquirer country) for period t, scaled by the sum of the total number of cross-border M&As 
between the target country and the acquiring country.  Therefore, this measure captures the 
proportion of total M&A between countries i and j in which country j is the acquirer.  As a result, 
this variable is bounded at 0 and 1 and is undefined in cases in which there is no M&A between a 
country-pair during the year.  In this section, I discuss tests used to determine the effect of tax 
system characteristics on the volume of cross-border M&As from both the target and the acquirer 
perspective; I discuss tests of the direction of cross-border M&As in the following section. 
In order to examine determinants of the volume of cross-border M&A, I estimate the 
following model using ordinary least squares regression, where all variables are as defined in 
Appendix 1:   
CBMA_Volume = α + β1Diff_Trate_CorpIncTaxi,j,t + β2Trate_Dividendsi,j,t + 
β3Aww_Tterri,j,t + β4Aterr_Twwi,j,t + β5Aonly_CFCi,j,t + β6Tonly_CFCi,j,t + 
β7Aonly_ThinCapitalizationi,j,t + β8Tonly_ThinCapitalizationi,j,t + 
β9Aonly_TransferPricingi,j,t + β10Tonly_TransferPricingi,j,t + β11Tonly_FTCi,j,t 
+ β12Aonly_FTCxi,j,t + β13Tonly_IPBoxi,j,t + β14Aonly_IPBoxi,j,t + ∑βkCONTROLSi,j,t + 
∑βkAcqFE + ∑βkYearFE + ε 
 
In this model, each observation is an ordered country pair, Xi,j (where country i denotes 
the country of the target firm and country j denotes the country of the acquiring firm), such that 
Canada-Japan and Japan-Canada would be two separate observations.   
In order to examine the effects of tax rates on the volume of cross-border M&As, I first 
calculate the difference between the acquiring country’s and the target country’s top statutory tax 
                                                
highly right-skewed.  While skewness in the dependent variable does not violate OLS assumptions, it does limit the 
usefulness and interpretation of the estimation results.  In Appendix 2, I display the results of an OLS estimation of 





rates on corporate income (Diff_Trate_CorpIncTax).10  Erel et al. (2012) find that the coefficient 
on Diff_Trate_CorpIncTax is positive and significant, indicating that firms are more likely to 
acquire targets in tax jurisdictions with lower corporate income tax rates, consistent with 
acquirers using cross-border M&A in order to engage in income-shifting tax avoidance.  I 
expand this analysis by examining the effect of dividend withholding tax rates, as well as other 
tax system characteristics likely to impact the tax cost of operating a foreign subsidiary.   
Withholding tax on dividend payments between the subsidiary and the parent firm 
represent a cost to repatriating the profits of the target.  As such, I expect that acquirers are likely 
to acquire targets in countries with a lower rate of withholding on dividends.  I construct 
Trate_Dividends as the rate of dividends withholding on dividends paid from the target country 
to the acquirer country.  Because dividend withholding rates are often reduced under the terms of 
bilateral tax treaties, for country pair year observations with bilateral tax treaties, I replace the 
general dividend withholding rate with the rate specified under the applicable treaty.  Because 
withholding taxes on repatriation of dividends is an additional cost of operating a foreign 
subsidiary, I expect that firms engage in more cross-border M&A when the rate of withholding 
on dividend repatriation is lower.  Therefore, I predict a negative coefficient on Trate_dividends. 
I also create twelve variables to examine the effects of tax system characteristics that 
affect the tax base of a multinational firm created by a cross-border M&A.  In this regression, I 
am interested in exploring how differences in the tax regimes of the target and the acquirer firms 
may affect the volume of cross-border M&A between the pair.  First, I examine the effect of 
                                                
10 I use the difference in the top statutory tax rates following prior literature (Huizinga and Voget 2009; Erel et al. 
2012; Feld et al. 2013; Atwood et al. 2015; Col and Errunza 2015) rather than the effective tax rate.  I believe this 
specification to be most appropriate for several reasons.  First, firms should base investment decisions on the rate of 
tax they will pay on their next dollar of income (the marginal tax rate), which is approximated more closely by the 
statutory rate than the effective tax rate.  Second, the effective tax rate is confounded by the tax system 
characteristics that I examine separately in the model.  Finally, a country-level effective tax rate includes the effects 




differences in the tax regime of the firms.  Specifically, whether the tax regime of the post-M&A 
multinational parent firm will be in a worldwide or territorial regime.  To do so, I include two 
indicator variables.  The first one, Aww_Tterr, is an indicator variable set equal to one if the 
acquiring firm is located in a country with a worldwide tax system and the target is located in a 
country with a territorial tax system, and zero otherwise.11  This variable captures M&As that 
result in a firm that was taxed under a territorial regime becoming taxed under a worldwide 
regime as a result of the transaction.  The second variable, Aterr_Tww, is an indicator variable 
set equal to one if the acquiring firm is located in a country with a territorial tax system and the 
target is located in a country with a worldwide tax system, and zero otherwise.  This variable 
captures M&As that result in a firm that was taxed under a worldwide regime becoming taxed 
under a territorial regime.  A common criticism of the U.S. worldwide tax system is that it makes 
U.S. acquirers non-competitive in global markets, one of which is the market for subsidiaries.  If 
this is true, I expect that firms in worldwide countries are less acquisitive, resulting in lower 
levels of cross-border M&A, particularly across targets in territorial regimes.  Therefore, I expect 
the coefficient on Aww_Tterr to be negative and the coefficient on Aterr_Tww to be positive, 
indicating lower (higher) volume of cross-border M&A between worldwide (territorial) acquirers 
and territorial (worldwide) targets. 
I construct similar indicator variables for the remaining five tax system characteristics.  
Aonly_CFC (Tonly_CFC) is an indicator variable set to one if only the acquirer (target) country 
                                                
11 In my setting, a country is designated as territorial if, for subsidiaries that are at least 25% owned, it allows at least 
a 95% participation exemption for foreign dividends paid out of active income.  For some countries, the dividend 
participation exemption only applies when the subsidiary is located in specific countries, such as a tax treaty partner, 
a country within the European Union or European Economic Area, or countries not blacklisted as tax havens.  As a 
result, I allow a country’s designation as worldwide or territorial to differ across country pairs.  My results are 
qualitatively and quantitatively similar when I designate a country as territorial without regard to specific country 
pairs.  In this case, a country is designated as territorial if it allows at least a 95% participation exemption for foreign 
dividends paid by a subsidiary that is at least 25% owned when the subsidiary is located in a treaty country or a 




has CFC provisions, and zero otherwise.  Because the presence of CFC provisions in the acquirer 
country may make the profits of the foreign subsidiary taxable in the acquirer country, I expect 
that acquirers subject to CFC provisions are disadvantaged in cross-border M&A transactions.  
Thus, I expect the coefficient on Aonly_CFC to be negative, reflecting a reduction in the volume 
of cross-border M&A when the acquirer country is located in a CFC regime and the target is not.   
Both thin capitalization rules and transfer pricing regulations limit the extent to which 
firms can shift profits to tax-preferred jurisdictions.  Because these regulations limit firms’ tax 
avoidance strategies through profit-shifting channels, I expect that the presence of these 
regulations will reduce the volume of cross-border M&A.  However, it is unclear whether the 
effect will be from the presence of regulation at the acquirer level or target level, as the direction 
in which the post-merger firm will wish to shift income is unclear, and tax regulators are 
concerned with income being shifted away from their own jurisdiction.  If post-merger firms, on 
average, prefer to shift income to the target (which is consistent with acquirer firms, on average, 
having a higher corporate income tax rate), I expect the coefficients on Aonly_ThinCapitalization 
(Tonly_ThinCapitalization) and Aonly_TransferPricing (Tonly_TransferPricing) to be negative 
(positive). 
Next, Aonly_FTC (Tonly_FTC) are indicator variables set to one if only the acquirer 
(target) country allows for a foreign tax credit to provide relief from double-taxation of foreign 
income, and zero otherwise.  For non-exempt foreign income, double taxation relief is generally 
provided by a tax credit or a tax deduction.  Because a foreign tax credit should reduce or 
eliminate the double-taxation of non-exempt foreign profits, I expect that firms allowed a foreign 




foreign subsidiaries at a lower cost.  Therefore, I expect the coefficient on Aonly_FTC to be 
positive and the coefficient on Tonly_FTC to be negative.   
Finally, Aonly_IPBox (Tonly_IPBox) is an indicator variable set equal to one if only the 
acquirer (target) country is an IP Box regime.  However, it is difficult to make predictions 
regarding the effect of IP box regimes on the volume of cross-border M&A.  Because intellectual 
property is among the assets easiest to transfer to tax-preferred jurisdictions, firms in countries 
without preferable tax treatment of intellectual property income may engage in more cross-
border M&A to facilitate shifting intellectual property to another tax jurisdiction, particularly 
jurisdictions that do provide tax-preferred treatment of income from IP.  This would result in 
reductions in the volume of cross-border M&A.  In this case, I predict a negative coefficient on 
Aonly_IPBox.  For acquirers not in IP Box regimes, the acquisition of a target in an IP Box 
regime may allow the acquirer to shift qualifying IP income to the target, which suggests a 
positive coefficient on Tonly_IPBox.  However, if the presence of an IP Box regime in their 
country provides an advantage to foreign acquirers, particularly in acquisitions of targets with 
high levels of IP income that is currently not tax-preferred, I predict a positive coefficient on 
Aonly_IPBox.  Because many IP Box regimes do not grant tax-advantaged treatment to income 
derived from acquired IP unless the IP is substantially further developed in the post-acquisition 
period, this effect may be limited. 
I also control for other determinants of cross-border M&As using variables from Erel et 
al. (2012).  I control for valuation differences by including diff_xrate equal to the difference 
between the real annual currency exchange rate return between the two countries’ currencies and 
diff_realri the difference in the real annual stock market return of the country indices.  I control 




ratings on the “extent to which investors are protected through disclosure of… financial 
information” from the WorldBank Doing Business survey.  I also control for the legal protection 
of minority shareholders using the difference between both country’s value for the anti-self-
dealing index from Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008) 
(diff_anti_selfdeal).  To control for language (cultural) barriers, I include an indicator variable 
equal to one if the two countries have the same primary language (religion), and zero otherwise.  
To control for geographic proximity, I include the great circle distance between the capital cities 
of the acquirer and target countries, scaled by 1,000 for ease of interpretation, (gcdist).12  I also 
control for the volume of business between the two countries using max_trade, the maximum 
bilateral imports or exports, where imports (exports) are measured as the total proportion of the 
target country’s imports (exports) from (to) the acquirer country.  Finally, I control for 
macroeconomic effects by including diff_gdp, the difference between the natural log of the 
countries’ GDP per capita in 2010 U.S. dollars, and diff_gdpgrowth, the difference in the real 
annual growth rate in GDP per capita.  Following Erel et al. (2012), I include acquirer country 
fixed effects because I am primarily interested in examining the effects of differences in tax 
characteristics between the acquirer and target countries on cross-border M&As between a 
country-pair.13  I also include year fixed effects to control for trends in cross-border M&A over 
time. 
                                                
12 Great circle distance is the shortest distance between two points on the surface of a sphere, and is calculated as 
3963.0*arcos[sin(lat1)*sin(lat2) + cos(lat1)*cos(lon2-lon1)], where lon1 (lon2) and lat1 (lat2) are the longitudes and 
latitudes of the capital city of the acquirer (target) country, respectively. 
13 In untabulated analysis, I replicate my primary findings without the inclusion of acquirer country fixed effects, 
and the results are qualitatively similar for the effect of tax system characteristics on the direction of cross-border 
M&A.  For the volume of cross-border M&A, I confirm the results in Table 3, but I also find evidence that the 
volume of cross-border M&A is diminished among worldwide acquirers and territorial targets and in cases in which 
only the target country allows foreign tax credits, consistent with expectation.  I further find that the volume of 
cross-border M&A is decreased (increased) when only the target country has thin capitalization requirements (only 
the acquirer country is an IP Box regime).  Predictions for these characteristics were less clear, but my results are 




Determinants of the Direction of Cross-Border M&As 
I next examine the effect of these characteristics on the direction of cross-border M&A, 
that is, given the opportunity for a M&A transaction between a firm in country i and a firm in 
country j, I examine which country is likely to house the acquiring firm.  In these tests, I use the 
dependent variable CBMA_Direction, which I construct by taking the number of cross-border 
acquisitions of firms in country i (the target country) by firms in country j (the acquirer country) 
for period t, and scaling it by the sum of the total number of cross-border M&As between the 
target country and the acquiring country.  Therefore, this measure captures the proportion of total 
M&A between countries i and j in which country j is the acquirer.  As a result, this variable is 
bounded at zero and one and is undefined in cases in which there is no M&A between a country-
pair during the year.  I examine how tax system characteristics influence the structure of cross-
border M&A between firms in countries with divergent tax policies with the following model 
using ordinary least squares regression, where all variables are as defined in Appendix 1:   
CBMA_Direction = α + β1Diff_Trate_CorpIncTaxi,j,t + β2Diff_Trate_Dividendsi,j,t + 
β3Aww_Tterri,j,t + β4Aterr_Twwi,j,t + β5Aonly_CFCi,j,t + β6Tonly_CFCi,j,t + 
β7Aonly_ThinCapitalizationi,j,t + β8Tonly_ThinCapitalizationi,j,t + 
β9Aonly_TransferPricingi,j,t + β10Tonly_TransferPricingi,j,t + 
β11Tonly_FTCi,j,t + β12Aonly_FTCxi,j,t + β13Tonly_IPBoxi,j,t + β14Aonly_IPBoxi,j,t + 
∑βkCONTROLSi,j,t + ∑βkAcqFE + ∑βkYearFE + ε 
 
Instead of examining the level of dividend withholding tax, as I did in Model (1), in this 
test, I replace Trate_Dividends with Diff_Trate_Dividends, which I calculate as the difference 
between the rate of withholding that would be paid on dividends repatriated from the target 
country to the acquirer country and the rate of withholding on the counterfactual corporate 
structure in which the dividends are repatriated from the acquirer country to the target country.  I 
                                                
regimes giving acquirers an advantage in cross-border M&A, specifically when the target country does not allow for 





do this because these tests examine the effect of taxes on the decision to structure the M&A, not 
whether to engage in M&A.  The decision regarding which firm will be the acquirer in a cross-
border M&A transaction should be influenced by the difference between the applicable rates, 
rather than the level. 
All controls from Model (1) are included in Model (2) with the exception of three non-
directional variables, geographic distance and the two indicator variables equal to one if the 
countries have the same primary language or religion, which I remove as non-directional 
variables should not explain the direction of cross-border M&A. 
 First, as above, I examine the effect of differences in the statutory corporate tax rate and 
the acquirer and target’s tax regimes.  Consistent with the finding in Erel et al. (2012), I predict a 
positive coefficient on Diff_Trate_CorpIncTax, indicating that the acquiring firm is, on average, 
subject to a higher corporate tax rate than the target.  Further, I predict a negative coefficient on 
Diff_Trate_Dividends, indicating that firms structure the M&A to minimize the withholding tax 
due on repatriations of income from the target to the acquirer.   
Next, I examine the effect of tax regime on the direction of cross-border M&A.  As 
acquirers located in worldwide tax regimes bring the income of the target under the umbrella of a 
worldwide regime, subjecting it to taxation at the acquirer level, I expect that, when firms from 
countries with different tax regimes engage in cross-border M&A, the acquirer is more likely to 
be from a territorial regime, while the target is more likely to be from a worldwide regime.  This 
is consistent with firms structuring M&A in order to avoid bringing the income of a territorial 
firm under the umbrella of a worldwide tax system.  Because I expect that firms in territorial 
regimes are more likely to acquire, while firms in worldwide regimes are more likely to be 




 Because the presence of CFC provisions in the acquirer country may result in additional 
taxes due on the income of the target, I expect that when only one country in a cross-border 
M&A transaction has CFC provisions, the M&A is likely to be structured in such a way as to 
avoid the applicability of the CFC provisions.  Therefore, I predict the acquiring firm will be less 
likely to be subject to CFC rules, suggesting a negative (positive) coefficient on Aonly_CFC 
(Tonly_CFC). 
 Thin capitalization rules and transfer pricing regulations both limit tax avoidance through 
the profit shifting channel.  However, because the direction in which the post-merger firm will 
wish to shift income is not clear, it is difficult to make predictions regarding the effect of these 
provisions on the direction of cross-border M&A.  If post-merger firms, on average, prefer to 
shift income to the target (which is consistent with acquirer firms, on average, having a higher 
corporate income tax rate), I expect the coefficients on Aonly_ThinCapitalization 
(Tonly_ThinCapitalization) and Aonly_TransferPricing (Tonly_TransferPricing) to be negative 
(positive). 
The presence of a foreign tax credit in the acquirer’s jurisdiction can mitigate the effect 
of paying taxes on the target’s income in both the target and the acquirer’s jurisdictions.  
Therefore, I expect that, when only one country involved in a cross-border M&A allows a 
foreign tax credit, the acquiring firm is likely to be allowed the credit.  Therefore, I expect a 
positive (negative) coefficient on Aonly_FTC (Tonly_FTC). 
Finally, I examine the effect of IP Box regimes on the direction of cross-border M&A.  
As with the effect of IP Box regimes on the volume of cross-border M&A, predictions regarding 
the effect on the direction of cross-border M&A are difficult.  It is possible that the presence of 




acquisitions of targets with high levels of IP income that is currently not tax-preferred, which 
would suggest a positive coefficient on Aonly_IPBox.  However, because many IP Box regimes 
do not extend tax-preferred treatment to acquired intellectual property unless it is substantially 
further developed in the post-merger period, it may be that IP Box regimes do not have any 
effect on the direction of cross-border M&A. 
Determinants by Acquirer Tax Regime 
I further expect that the tax system characteristics may have different implications for 
cross-border M&As when the acquiring firm is taxed under a worldwide or territorial regime, as 
many of these tax system characteristics will generate different tax effects under each regime.  
For example, in a worldwide tax system, CFC provisions prevent the deferral of the recognition 
of taxable income that otherwise would have been taxed upon repatriation.  However, in a 
territorial tax system, CFC provisions require the inclusion of income that would not otherwise 
be subjected to tax in the acquirer country at all.  Similarly, transfer pricing regulations may be 
more costly for parent firms located in territorial tax systems.  When a firm in a territorial tax 
system is able to shift income to a foreign subsidiary in a tax-preferred jurisdiction, the income is 
never subject to tax by the parent country.  However, in a pure worldwide system, shifting 
income does not produce permanent tax avoidance, but tax deferral.14  Consistent with this, 
Markle (2016) finds that firms in territorial tax regimes engage in more profit shifting than firms 
in worldwide systems.   
Because theory suggests that the effect of these characteristics may vary with the 
acquiring firm’s tax regime, I also estimate the effect of these characteristics separately for 
                                                
14 In countries with a worldwide system that allows worldwide averaging (all foreign income and all foreign tax is 
pooled) for purposes of calculating a foreign tax credit limitation (generally referred to as “cross-crediting”), profit 





acquiring countries in worldwide regimes and acquiring countries in territorial regimes to 
determine if the impact of these tax system characteristics on cross-border M&As differs across 
acquirer regime.  Specifically, I estimate this regression separately for the acquirer countries in a 
worldwide system and those in a territorial system by modifying regression model (1) to 
eliminate the variables Aww_Tterr and Aterr_Tww, and replace that with an indicator variable, 
T_ww, equal to one if the target country is a worldwide tax regime, and zero otherwise.  I use 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression and conduct t-tests of differences in coefficients across the two 
subsamples. 
 
4. Data Sources and Sample Construction 
I construct my sample of M&As using Security Data Corporation’s (SDC) Mergers and 
Corporate Transactions database.  I collect all M&As announced between January 1, 2006 and 
December 31, 2015, inclusive.  Following Erel et al. (2012), I exclude leveraged buyouts, spin-
offs, recapitalizations, self-tender offers, exchange offers, repurchases, and privatizations, and I 
eliminate deals in which either the target or acquirer is a government agency or in the financial 
or utilities industries.15   In my final sample, I consider M&A transactions from 50 countries for 
which I have all necessary control variables, which covers 62,614 total cross-border M&A 
transactions.  Because each observation is an ordered country pair year and I have 50 countries in 
my sample, the total number of observations theoretically available is 24,500 (50 × 49 × 10).  
                                                
15 In untabulated analysis, I re-estimate my analyses on two additional samples.  First, I expand the sample to 
consider M&A not completed.  Next, I further restrict my main sample to cross-border M&A in which the target is 
more than 50% owned following the M&A transaction and the ultimate acquirer is located in the same country as 
the immediate acquirer following sensitivity tests in Huizinga and Voget (2009) and main analyses in Hagen and 




However, due to missing data or an undefined dependent variable, the number of observations 
drops to 21,754 for my primary volume analysis and 10,454 for my primary direction analysis.16   
My variables of interest are tax rates and tax system characteristics hand-collected from 
Ernst & Young Worldwide Corporate Tax Guides (2004-2015) and the PwC Worldwide Tax 
Summaries (2010/2011-2015/2016).  This allows me to take advantage of changes in tax regimes 
across time.  From SDC, I collect the announcement date, the fraction of the target firms owned 
by the acquirer following the acquisition, and primary industry as indicated by the Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) code, and country of domicile17, along with the completion date 
where applicable, and deal value (in U.S. dollar terms) where available. 
Country-level variables are collected from multiple sources.  I collect primary language 
and primary religion from the FBI World Factbook.  I obtain the latitude and longitude of the 
capital cities of each country from WorldData (www.worlddata.info).  Bilateral trade data is 
collected from the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database.  Gross domestic 
product (GDP) per capita and GDP per capita growth rates are collected from the WorldBank 
National Accounts data.  I collect the 2010 consumer price index (CPI) from the International 
Monetary Fund through WorldBank.  I measure the quality of accounting disclosure using the 
disclosure index from the WorldBank Doing Business Project.  The anti-self-dealing index, a 
measure of protections for minority shareholders, is from Djankov et al. (2008).  Institutional 
quality is collected from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) published by the Political 
Risk Services group following Bekaert, Harvey, and Luncblad (2005).  Investment profile is also 
                                                
16 A value for CBMA_Direction will be undefined if no cross-border M&As occurred between countries i and j 
during the year. 




collected from the ICRG.  I collect nominal bilateral exchanges rates and total value-weighted 
return indices from Datastream. 
 
5. Primary Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 1 displays the 50 countries included in my analysis, along with the pattern of cross-
border and domestic M&As over my entire sample period.  Each row contains a target country, 
and each column contains an acquirer country, such that the diagonal entries contain the number 
of domestic M&As that occurred in a country over my sample period.  The off-diagonal entries 
represent the number of cross-border M&As that occurred for each ordered country pair.  In 
terms of the raw number of cross-border M&As, the United States (Kenya) is both the most 
(least) common acquirer and the most (least) commonly targeted in cross-border M&As during 
my sample period.  When the number of cross-border M&As is scaled by the size of the 
domestic M&A market, firms in Luxembourg are most likely to be acquirers and targets in cross-
border M&As, while firms in Russia (Japan) are least likely to be acquirers (targets). 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
In Table 2, I present descriptive statistics for my sample of ordered country pair years.  
By construction, the mean difference in corporate income tax rates is near zero, as the use of 
ordered country pair observations creates off-setting values.  Differences in dividend tax rates, 
however, are asymmetrical, as the tax rate paid on dividends from country i to country j may not 
equal the tax rate paid on dividends from country j to country i.  My descriptive statistics suggest 
that in about half of country pairs, both the target and the acquirer operate in either a territorial or 




located in a worldwide regime and a quarter of country pairs in which only the target country is 
located in a worldwide regime.  CFC provisions and thin capitalization rules occur similarly in 
my sample.  Transfer pricing and the allowance of a foreign tax credit are far more common, 
leaving a smaller number of ordered country pair year observations in which one country does 
not exhibit the tax system characteristic.  IP Box regimes are relatively uncommon, producing a 
similar result. 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
Determinants of the Volume of Cross-Border M&A 
The results of the estimation of model (1) are presented in Table 3 Panel A.  Across 
known determinants of the volume of cross-border M&As, my results are largely consistent with 
prior literature.  Consistent with Erel et al. (2012), I find that geographic distance, existing trade, 
shared language, and cultural similarity (measured using shared primary religion) are important 
determinants of the volume of cross-border M&A.  Specifically, I find that the volume of cross-
border M&A between a country-pair is higher when the countries share a language, share a 
religion, are sizeable trading partners, and are close to each other (GCDist is smaller).  I also find 
that the volume of cross-border M&A is lower when Diff_GDPgrowth is higher.  A higher value 
for Diff_GDPgrowth indicates that the target country’s GDP growth is higher than the acquirer 
country’s GDP growth.  Thus, this result indicates that the volume of cross-border M&A is 
higher between acquirer countries with lower GDP growth than their target countries, suggesting 
that firms increase cross-border M&A to invest in higher-growth countries.  I also find evidence 
that the volume of cross-border M&As is higher among country pairs in which the target has 
better disclosure quality than the acquirer (Diff_DisclosureIndex is lower); this finding is not 




my model.  Unlike Erel et al. (2012), however, I do not find that firms increase cross-border 
M&A in order to exploit valuation effects caused by currency exchange rate or stock market 
returns. 
INSERT TABLE 3, PANEL A HERE 
 Similar to Erel et al. (2012), I find that acquirers more frequently acquire targets in 
countries with lower statutory income tax rates.  In addition to examining statutory corporate tax 
rates, I expand Erel et al. (2012) to examine the effect of dividend withholding rates.  My results 
suggest that the volume of cross-border M&A increases when the cost of repatriating dividends 
from the target the acquirer country is lower. 
Of the tax system characteristics that I examine, I find that CFC provisions and transfer 
pricing regulations are significant determinants of cross-border M&A.  Consistent with 
predictions, my results suggest that the presence of CFC provisions in the acquirer country 
reduces the volume of cross-border M&As.  The significantly negative coefficient on Aonly_TP 
suggests that transfer pricing regulations also reduce the returns to cross-border M&A, consistent 
with these regulations preventing or curtailing the use of profit-shifting for tax avoidance.  This 
result is consistent with the post-merger firm, on average, preferring to shift taxable income from 
the acquirer to the target.  Though the coefficients are directionally consistent with firms in 
territorial systems being advantaged in cross-border M&As compared to worldwide tax systems, 
the coefficients are insignificant.  I also do not find that thin capitalization rules, foreign tax 
credits, or IP Box regimes are significant determinants of the volume of M&A.   
In Table 3, Panel B, I examine each tax system characteristic independently, and I find my 
results are largely consistent across these specifications.  Again, I find that the presence of CFC 




withholding reduce the volume of cross-border M&A.  However, I find that the coefficient on 
Diff_Trate_CorpIncTax, while positive in all specifications, is only significant in two of the six 
specifications.  Further, I find that, though the effect is subsumed by the effect of other tax 
system characteristics, the coefficient on auponly_ipbox is negative and significant, suggesting 
that  firms located in tax jurisdictions that allow for tax-preferenced treatment of IP income are 
less likely to acquire foreign targets.  I interpret this as weak evidence that IP box regimes may 
successfully reduce firms’ incentives to shift income. 
INSERT TABLE 3, PANEL B HERE 
Determinants of Volume by Acquirer Tax Regime 
Next, I present the results of my estimation of model (1) separately for acquirers based in 
worldwide and territorial regimes in Table 4.  In the analysis above, I make determinations of 
worldwide and territorial regimes at the country pair year level.  However, to compare the way 
these tax system characteristics impact M&As across tax regimes, I indicate an acquirer country 
as worldwide or territorial without consideration for the specific target country in this anlaysis.  
A country is indicated as worldwide or territorial based on the general tax treatment for countries 
under a bilateral tax treaty.  Countries that only allow dividend participation exemptions under 
the European Union Parent-Subsidiary Directive of 1990 are not considered to be generally 
territorial.18  In this analysis, I continue to find evidence that CFC provisions and transfer pricing 
regulations in the acquirer country reduce the volume of cross-border M&A across both 
worldwide and territorial regimes.  However, I do not find evidence that any of these tax system 
characteristics have differential effects on the volume of cross-border M&A based on the 
acquirer tax regime.   
                                                
18 Results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar if I allow the acquirer country’s regime designation to change 




INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
Determinants of the Direction of Cross-Border M&A 
Next, I examine the effect of tax system characteristics on the direction of cross-border 
M&A.  That is, given that an M&A occurs between firms located in two countries, I examine 
which country is more likely to be the domicile of the acquiring firm.  I present the results of my 
estimation of Model (2) in Table 5.   
INSERT TABLE 5, PANEL A HERE 
In Table 5, Panel A, I again find strong evidence that tax rates influence cross-border 
M&A decisions.  Consistent with the findings in Erel et al. (2012), I find that the acquirer is 
likely to have a higher rate of tax on corporate income than the target firm, indicated by a 
positive coefficient on Diff_trate_Corpinctax.  Further, I document a significantly negative 
coefficient on Diff_Trate_Dividends.  This provides evidence that firms select the direction of 
the M&A that minimizes the cost of withholding tax on dividends paid between the two 
countries.  I also find a significantly negative coefficient on Aww_Tterr, indicating that cross-
border M&A between an acquirer in a worldwide regime and a target in a territorial regime is 
less common than cross-border M&A between an acquirer in a territorial regime and a target in a 
worldwide regime or between a target and acquirer in the same type of tax regime.  This 
indicates that cross-border M&As are less likely to be structured in such a way that a target in a 
territorial system is put under the umbrella of a worldwide regime. 
My results indicate that CFC provisions and thin capitalization rules have the largest 
influence on the direction of cross-border M&A.  I find that cross-border M&As are positively 
(negatively) associated with the target (acquirer) alone being subject to CFC provisions.  This is 




of the target being classified as a controlled foreign corporation.  The size and significance of the 
coefficients on CFC provisions suggests that the presence of CFC provisions is a more important 
factor in determining the direction of cross-border M&A than whether the acquirer is in a 
worldwide or territorial regime.  I suggest that this could be due to the deferral privilege 
available in many worldwide regimes.  This privilege allows firms to defer paying the additional 
layer of tax until the profits of the target are repatriated to the acquirer country.  This privilege 
can be used to avoid the taxes indefinitely, provided that the acquirer continues to invest the 
profits of the target in foreign assets. 
I also find evidence that cross-border M&As are positively (negatively) associated with 
the acquirer (target) being subject to thin capitalization rules when the target (acquirer) is not 
subject to these rules.  This result is consistent with post-merger firms preferring to shift income 
from the acquirer to the target through the use of inter-company debt.  However, I also find a 
positive and significant coefficient on Aonly_TP. 
 Finally, I find a positive and significant coefficient on Aonly_FTC, suggesting that M&A 
is generally structured such that the acquirer can claim a foreign tax credit on taxes paid to 
foreign jurisdictions on income that is also subject to tax in the home country.  I do not find 
evidence that firms consider the presence of an IP box regime to influence the direction of cross-
border M&A. 
 In Table 5 Panel B, I allow each tax system characteristic to enter the regression 
independently.  My results on corporate income tax rates, dividend withholding rates, CFC 
provisions and thin capitalization rules are virtually unchanged, but I do not find that tax regime 
(worldwide or territorial) significantly explains the direction of M&A in this specification.  




A, becomes significantly negative in this specification.  It is possible that, without controlling for 
the acquirer and target countries’ tax regime, the presence of a foreign tax credit is acting as a 
proxy for a worldwide tax regime. 
INSERT TABLE 5, PANEL B HERE 
Determinants of Direction by Acquirer Tax Regime 
 In Table 6, I separately estimate the regression for the sample of acquirers in worldwide 
regimes and acquirers in territorial regimes.   
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
My results are largely consistent across both regimes, suggesting that my findings in 
Table 5 are not driven by only one tax regime.  However, I do find that the coefficient on 
Tonly_FTC to be positive and significant for acquirers in worldwide regimes, but negative and 
significant for acquirers in territorial regimes.  In a territorial regime, the presence of a foreign 
tax credit affects the direction of cross-border M&A in a way that is consistent with predictions.  
Specifically, the direction of cross-border M&A favors acquirers that are granted a foreign tax 
credit when only one of the countries allows it.  The results in a worldwide regime, however, are 
surprising.  I find a strong positive coefficient on Tonly_FTC that exceeds the positive and 
significant coefficient on Aonly_FTC.  Note that if the acquirer is in a worldwide regime but only 
the target country allows a foreign tax credit, the acquirer taxes worldwide income, but does not 
allow a general double-tax relief provision.  In these rare occurrences, the countries provide 
relief from double-taxation only through the presence of existing tax treaties, which themselves 
may grant foreign tax credits.  Because I do not consult treaty provisions in defining any tax 




of countries in worldwide regimes that do not grant a general foreign tax credit.  I note that this 
strange result is driven by a small number of countries.  
 
6. Supplemental Tests 
Country-Level Analysis 
 In my main tests, I use a sample of ordered country pair years to examine the effect of 
differences in tax system characteristics between the countries of the acquirer and the target firms 
in the volume and direction of cross-border M&A between the two countries.  To supplement 
these findings, I present similar tests on a sample of country-year observations.  Because I do not 
use country-pair observations, I do not exploit differences in tax system characteristics across the 
two countries involved in a cross-border M&A.  Rather, I examine whether the presence of these 
tax system characteristics has an effect on the volume or direction of the country’s global M&A 
investments.  In this specification, I separately examine the volume of cross-border M&A from a 
target perspective and an acquirer perspective.  In examining the target perspective, I determine 
the effect of tax system characteristics on the likelihood of being a target in a cross-border M&A 
relative to being targeted domestically.  Similarly, the acquirer perspective examines the effect of 
tax system characteristics on the likelihood of being an acquirer in a cross-border M&A relative 
to acquiring domestically.  Finally, I examine the effect of tax system characteristics on the 
direction of global M&A.  That is, considering all cross-border M&A, I examine the likelihood 
that a country is a net global acquirer or a net global target. 
I specify a new model to examine these country-level tax system characteristics.  
Specifically, I estimate the following model using ordinary least squares regression where all 




CL = α + β1Trate_CorpIncTaxx,t-1 + β2WWx,t-1 + β3CFCx,t-1 +  
β4ThinCapitalizationx,t-1 + β5TransferPricingx,t-1 +β6FTCx,t-1 + β7IPBoxx,t-1 +  
∑βkCONTROLSx,t-1 + ∑βkYearFE + ε 
 
In this model, each observation is a country year, where x denotes country and t denotes 
year.  My dependent variables, CL_TVolume (CL_AVolume) and CL_Direction, capture the total 
number of firms in country x targeted by foreign firms (the total number of foreign firms 
acquired by firms in country x) relative to firms targeted domestically, and the proportion of total 
cross-border M&A in which the country is the acquirer, respectively.  CL_TVolume 
(CL_AVolume) is calculated as the number of cross-border acquisitions of targets in country x by 
acquirers in all foreign countries (the total number of acquisitions by firms in country x of targets 
in all countries excluding country x) for period t, scaled by the total number of domestic mergers 
in country x.  This measure captures the volume of targets in country x acquired by foreign firms 
relative to those acquired by domestic firms.  CL_Direction is the proportion of cross-border 
M&A involving country x in which country x is the acquirer, and is calculated as the number of 
cross-border acquisitions in which the acquiring firm is in country x for period t, scaled by the 
sum of the total number of cross-border M&As in which either the acquiring firm or the targeted 
firm is in country x.  Therefore, a value greater than .5 indicates that the country is a net acquirer 
in cross-border M&A, while a value less than .5 indicates the country is a net target.  Because 
dividend withholding rates vary greatly depending upon the partner country and cannot be 
reliably determined on a country level, I do not include dividend withholding rates in this model.  
Trate_CorpIncTax is defined as the top statutory tax rate on corporate income.  All other tax 
system characteristics are indicator variables equal to one if the characteristic is present in 





My sample for these analyses are country-year observations.  Because I have a sample of 
50 countries over 10 years, I have a possible 500 total observations (50×10).  However, I lose 31 
observations due to missing data, leaving me with 469 total observations.  I present descriptive 
statistics for this sample in Table 7. 
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE 
 In my sample, the median top statutory tax rate is 25%, and my sample is almost evenly 
divided on CFC provisions, thin capitalization rules, and worldwide tax regime.  Transfer pricing 
regulations and foreign tax credits are far more common, while only 13.6% of countries have IP 
Box regimes. 
 I present the results of my estimation of Model (3) in Tables 8 and 9.  I first examine the 
effect of these characteristics on the volume of cross-border M&A in Table 8.  In Table 8, Panel 
A, I examine the target perspective.  In Table 8, Panel B, I examine the acquirer’s perspective. 
INSERT TABLE 8, PANEL A HERE 
In Table 8, Panel A, I adopt the target perspective and examine the effect of tax system 
characteristics on the likelihood of being targeted by a foreign firm.  The negative and significant 
coefficient on Trate_CorpIncTax indicates that countries with high corporate income tax rates 
are less likely to be acquired by a foreign firm relative to the size of their domestic M&A market.  
This is consistent with my findings in Table 3, which indicates that, in cross-border M&A, the 
acquiring firm is generally subjected to a higher tax rate than the target firm.  I find a similar 
results for the presence of a foreign tax credit, indicating that firms that allowed a foreign tax 
credit are less likely to be acquired in cross-border M&A.   The coefficient on IPBox is positive 
and significant, indicating that the presence of an IP Box regime makes a firm more likely to be 




jurisdictions with favorable tax treatment of IP income.  Notably, the positive coefficient on WW 
is narrowly insignificant (significant in a one-tailed test).  A positive and significant coefficient 
on this variable would indicate that the presence of a worldwide regime increases the volume of 
takeovers by foreign firms relative to domestic takeovers, which is consistent with arguments 
that the U.S. worldwide tax system may make U.S. firms more valuable in the hands of a foreign 
parent.   
INSERT TABLE 8, PANEL B 
 In Table 8, Panel B, I examine the acquirer’s perspective.  In this analysis, I find a 
negative and significant coefficient on CFC.  I interpret this as additional support for my finding 
in Table 3, which suggests that the presence of CFC provisions in the acquirer country decrease 
the volume of cross-border M&A.   
INSERT TABLE 9 HERE 
In Table 9, I examine the effect of these tax system characteristics on the direction of 
cross-border M&A for a country.  That is, considering all cross-border M&A in which a firm in 
the country is a participant, in what proportion is the country acquiring a foreign target rather 
than being acquired by a foreign firm?  I find that statutory tax rate, CFC provisions, and thin 
capitalization provisions are determinants of the direction of cross-border M&A, consistent with 
the results in Table 5.  Specifically, I find that having a high corporate tax rate makes a country 
more likely to be a net acquirer, while the presence of CFC provisions and thin capitalization 
rules reduce the likelihood that a country will be a net acquirer. 
 




My primary analyses provide insight into the determinants of the volume and direction of 
cross-border M&As.  However, tax system characteristics are also likely to be considerations in 
other decisions regarding the structure of cross-border M&A.  For these analyses, I use the same 
sample used in Tables 3 through 6, though my sample size is reduced by the number of ordered 
country pair year observations that do not have at least one completed cross-border M&A during 
the year.19   
Obtaining Control in Cross-Border M&A 
First, I consider the effect of tax system characteristics on the likelihood of the acquirer 
obtaining control (which I define as greater than or equal to 50% ownership) of the target.  While 
all of the M&A transactions in my sample represent a substantial investment in the target, 
obtaining control of the target will trigger the effect of CFC provisions, if applicable, though it 
may also make tax avoidance strategies, such as profit shifting, more likely.  To examine the 
effect of tax system characteristics on the likelihood of obtaining control of a foreign target, I 
construct CBMA_Control as the total number of cross-border acquisitions of firms in country i 
by firms in country j for period t in which the acquirer owns over 50 percent of the target 
following the transaction, and scaling it by total number of cross-border acquisitions of firms in 
country i by firms in country j for period t.  I present the results in Table 10.  As predicted, CFC 
provisions are highly important in determining the likelihood of a firm obtaining control of the 
target in a cross-border M&A.  Consistent with expectations, the proportion of cross-border 
M&A that result in a controlled subsidiary is significantly lower (higher) when the acquirer 
(target) alone is subject to CFC provisions.  The M&A is also more likely to result in a 
                                                
19 A value for CBMA_intermediary and CBMA_Control will be undefined if no cross-border M&A occurred in 




controlled target when the acquirer has a higher corporate tax rate, benefits from the allowance 
of a foreign tax credit, and is not subject to thin capitalization rules. 
INSERT TABLE 10 HERE 
Use of an Intermediary Country in Cross-Border M&A 
Next, I consider the use of an immediate acquirer in a country that is neither country i nor 
country j, as the total proportion of cross-border M&As in which the acquisition was facilitated 
through a direct acquirer located in a third country,  I construct CBMA_Intermediary as the total 
number of cross-border acquisitions of firms in country i by firms in country j through a direct 
acquirer located in a country that is neither country i nor country j for period t, and scaling it by 
total number of cross-border acquisitions of firms in country i by firms in country j for period t.  
Table 11 presents the results.   
INSERT TABLE 11 HERE 
I find that, when the target is located in a worldwide regime and the acquirer is located in 
a territorial regime, the cross-border M&A is less likely to include an intermediary in a third 
country.  As bringing a firm from a territorial regime under the umbrella of a worldwide regime 
is costly, it is possible that firms in worldwide regimes are more likely to own territorial firms 
through another country.  In this way, the post-merger multinational firm could use an 
intermediary country to facilitate the flow of capital between subsidiaries without repatriating 
income from the territorial subsidiary to the worldwide parent firm.  In addition, I find that firms 





Tax System Characteristics and Merger Premia 
 In addition to examining the volume, direction, and structure of cross-border M&A, I 
next examine the effect of tax system characteristics on the merger premia in cross-border M&A.  
In these tests, I eliminate cross-border M&A transactions for which the four-week merger 
premium is unavailable in SDC, leaving me with only 1,518 observations.   
Premia = α + β1Diff_Trate_CorpIncTaxi,j,t-1 + β2Diff_Trate_Dividendsi,j,t-1 + 
β3Aww_Tterri,j,t-1 + β4Aterr_Twwi,j,t-1 + β5Aonly_CFCi,j,t-1 + β6Tonly_CFCi,j,t-1 + 
β7Aonly_ThinCapitalizationi,j,t-1 + β8Tonly_ThinCapitalizationi,j,t-1 + 
β9Aonly_TransferPricingi,j,t-1 + β10Tonly_TransferPricingi,j,t-1 + 
β11Tonly_FTCi,j,t-1 + β12Aonly_FTCxi,j,t-1 + β13Tonly_IPBoxi,j,t-1 + β14Aonly_IPBoxi,j,t-1 + 
∑βkCONTROLSi,j,t-1 + ∑βkAcqFE + ∑βkYearFE + ε 
 
In addition to the control variables used above, I include several additional controls in 
this model to address known determinants of merger premia, including an indicator variable for 
same industry, an indicator variable for government involvement, and indicator variable for 
unsolicited M&A, an indicator variable for the use of a Big 4 auditor, and indicator variable for a 
transaction that takes the target private, and indicator for a competing bid on the target, and 
controls for size and ownership of the target prior to the M&A.  I present descriptive statistics for 
this sample in Table 12. 
INSERT TABLE 12 HERE 
 I present my results in Table 13.  Of all of the tax system characteristics that I examine, 
only tax regime and transfer pricing regulations return a significant coefficient.  Specifically, I 
find that the acquirer pays a higher merger premium when the cross-border M&A involves a 
territorial acquirer and a worldwide target.  This is consistent with territorial acquirers being able 
to outbid worldwide acquirers in the global M&A market, suggesting that worldwide tax system 
may put acquirers at a competitive disadvantage.  I also find that merger premia are reduced 





M&A facilitating tax avoidance through a profit-shifting channel.  Because transfer pricing 
regulations limit firms’ ability to generate tax savings through profit shifting mechanisms, 
acquirers subject to transfer pricing regulations may incur a higher cost to operate the subsidiary 
than an acquirer not subject to these rules. 
 
8. Conclusion 
 This paper contributes to the literature on cross-border M&As by examining the effects 
of tax system characteristics on the volume, direction, structure, and merger premia of cross-
border M&As.  I find that naïve tax variables, such as the difference in top statutory corporate 
tax rates, do not fully explain the impact of taxes on cross-border M&As.  My evidence suggests 
that the volume of cross-border M&A is affected by the difference in corporate income tax rates, 
the presence of CFC provisions, and the presence of transfer pricing rules.  I further find that the 
direction of cross-border M&A is affected by differences in corporate income tax rates and 
dividend withholding rates, tax regime, and the presence of CFC provisions and thin 
capitalization rules, and the allowance of a foreign tax credit.  My results suggest that the 
presence of CFC provisions decreases both the volume of cross-border M&A and the likelihood 
that a firm is the acquirer in cross-border M&A.  Regulations meant to limit tax avoidance 
through profit shifting also affects the global M&A market.  I find that thin capitalization rules 
reduce the likelihood of a country acting as the acquirer in cross border M&A and that the 
presence of transfer pricing regulations reduces the incidence of cross-border M&A. 
In additional analyses, I examine determinants of the structure and merger premia of 
cross-border M&As.  Consistent with expectation, I find evidence that CFC provisions result in a 




that when the target is located in a worldwide regime and the acquirer is located in a territorial 
regime, the cross-border M&A is less likely to include an intermediary in a third country.  These 
results suggest that firms respond to tax costs of cross-border M&As by limiting the percent of 
the target acquired and employing the use of an intermediary in a third country.   
However, I do find limited evidence that tax system characteristics influence the merger 
premia in cross-border M&A.  My results suggest that territorial acquirers may pay a higher 
merger premia, consistent with the territorial regime giving these acquirers a competitive 
advantage.  I find that the presence of transfer pricing regulations in the acquirer country 
decrease the merger premia, consistent with transfer pricing regulations limiting tax avoidance 
by the post-merger firm through profit shifting. 
This study contributes to the ongoing debate regarding U.S. tax reform and the recent 
passage of the TJCA2017, as a central focus of both has been the ability of U.S. multinationals to 
compete with firms in territorial regimes.  My results suggest that criticisms of the U.S. 
worldwide tax system hurting U.S. firms in global markets are not baseless.  However, the effect 
of CFC provisions, which were not affected by TCJA2017, may be more detrimental to U.S. 
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10. Appendix 1: Variable Descriptions 
 
Variable Variable Definition 
CBMA_Volume The total number of cross-border deals in year t in which the target is 
from country i and the acquirer is from country j, scaled by the sum of 
the total number of domestic M&As in country j and in country i in 
year t then multiplied by 100. (Source: Security Data Corporation’s 
(SDC) Mergers and Corporate Transactions database) 
CBMA_Direction The total number of cross-border deals in year t in which the target is 
from country i and the acquirer is from country j, scaled by the sum of 
the total number of cross-border M&As between country i and j in year 
t then multiplied by 100. (Source: Security Data Corporation’s (SDC) 
Mergers and Corporate Transactions database) 
CL_TVolume The total number of cross-border deals in year t in which the target is 
from country i, scaled by the total number of domestic M&As  in 
country i in year t then multiplied by 100. (Source: Security Data 
Corporation’s (SDC) Mergers and Corporate Transactions database) 
CL_AVolume The total number of cross-border deals in year t in which the acquirer is 
from country j, scaled by the total number of domestic M&As in 
country j in year t then multiplied by 100. (Source: Security Data 
Corporation’s (SDC) Mergers and Corporate Transactions database) 
CL_Direction The total number of cross-border deals in year t in which the target is 
from country i, scaled by the sum of the total number of cross-border 
M&As in which the target is from country i and the acquirer is from 
country i in year t then multiplied by 100. (Source: Security Data 
Corporation’s (SDC) Mergers and Corporate Transactions database) 
CBMA_Control The total number of cross-border deals in year t in which the target is 
from country i, the acquirer is from country j and the acquirer owns 
over 50% of the target following the M&A transaction, scaled by the 
total number of cross-border deals in year t in which the target is from 
country i and the acquirer is from country j in year t then multiplied by 
100. (Source: Security Data Corporation’s (SDC) Mergers and 
Corporate Transactions database) 
CBMA_Intermediary The total number of cross-border deals in year t in which the target is 
from country i, the acquirer is from country j and the immediate 
acquirer is from neither country i nor j, scaled by the total number of 
cross-border deals in year t in which the target is from country i and the 
acquirer is from country j in year t then multiplied by 100. (Source: 
Security Data Corporation’s (SDC) Mergers and Corporate 
Transactions database) 
CBMA_Erel The total number of cross-border deals in year t in which the target is 
from country i and the acquirer is from country j, scaled by the sum of 




total number of domestic M&As in country i in year t then multiplied 
by 100. (Source: Security Data Corporation’s (SDC) Mergers and 
Corporate Transactions database) 
Trate_CorpIncTax The difference between the top statutory corporate income tax rate in the 
country. (Source: E&Y Worldwide Corporate Tax Guides and the PwC 
Worldwide Tax Summaries) 
Diff_Trate_CorpIncTax The difference between the top statutory corporate income tax rate in the 
acquirer (j) and target (i) countries. (Source: E&Y Worldwide Corporate 
Tax Guides and the PwC Worldwide Tax Summaries) 
Trate_Dividends the rate of withholding on dividends paid from the target country (i) to 
the acquirer country (j) ,where rates may be reduced under existing tax 
treaties (Source: E&Y Worldwide Corporate Tax Guides and the PwC 
Worldwide Tax Summaries) 
Diff_Trate_Dividends The difference between the rate of withholding on dividends paid from 
the target country (i) to the acquirer country (j) and the rate of 
withholding on dividends paid from the target country (i) to the acquirer 
country (j), where both rates are reduced under existing tax treaties 
where applicable (Source: E&Y Worldwide Corporate Tax Guides and 
the PwC Worldwide Tax Summaries) 
WW An indicator variable set equal to one if the country has a 
worldwide tax system, and zero otherwise, where the tax system is 
considered territorial if it exempts at least 95% of foreign 
dividends paid out of active income by a subsidiary that is at least 
25% owned as determined with respect to the specific acquirer 
country (Source: E&Y Worldwide Corporate Tax Guides and the PwC 
Worldwide Tax Summaries) 
Aww_Tterr An indicator variable set equal to one if the acquirer (j) country has a 
worldwide tax system and the target (i) country has a territorial tax 
system, and zero otherwise, where the tax system is considered 
territorial if it exempts at least 95% of foreign dividends paid out 
of active income by a subsidiary that is at least 25% owned as 
determined with respect to the specific acquirer country (Source: 
E&Y Worldwide Corporate Tax Guides and the PwC Worldwide Tax 
Summaries) 
Aterr_Tww An indicator variable set equal to one if the acquirer (j) country has a 
worldwide tax system and the target (i) country has a territorial tax 
system, and zero otherwise, where the tax system is considered 
territorial if it exempts at least 95% of foreign dividends paid out 
of active income by a subsidiary that is at least 25% owned as 
determined with respect to the specific acquirer country (Source: 





CFC An indicator variable set equal to one if the country has Controlled 
Foreign Corporation provisions, and zero otherwise (Source: E&Y 
Worldwide Corporate Tax Guides and the PwC Worldwide Tax 
Summaries) 
Aonly_CFC An indicator variable set equal to one if the acquirer (j) country has 
Controlled Foreign Corporation provisions and the target (i) 
country does not, and zero otherwise (Source: E&Y Worldwide 
Corporate Tax Guides and the PwC Worldwide Tax Summaries) 
Tonly_CFC An indicator variable set equal to one if the target (i) country has 
Controlled Foreign Corporation provisions and the acquirer (j) 
country does not, and zero otherwise (Source: E&Y Worldwide 
Corporate Tax Guides and the PwC Worldwide Tax Summaries) 
ThinCapitalization An indicator variable set equal to one if the country has thin 
capitalization rules, and zero otherwise (Source: E&Y Worldwide 
Corporate Tax Guides and the PwC Worldwide Tax Summaries) 
Aonly_Thincapitalization An indicator variable set equal to one if the acquirer (j) country has 
thin capitalization rules and the target (i) country does not, and zero 
otherwise (Source: E&Y Worldwide Corporate Tax Guides and the 
PwC Worldwide Tax Summaries) 
Tonly_Thincapitalization An indicator variable set equal to one if the target (i) country has 
thin capitalization rules and the acquirer (j) country does not, and 
zero otherwise (Source: E&Y Worldwide Corporate Tax Guides and 
the PwC Worldwide Tax Summaries) 
TransferPricing An indicator variable set equal to one if the country has specific 
transfer pricing regulations, and zero otherwise (Source: E&Y 
Worldwide Corporate Tax Guides and the PwC Worldwide Tax 
Summaries) 
Aonly_TransferPricing An indicator variable set equal to one if the acquirer (j) country has 
specific transfer pricing regulations and the target (i) country does 
not, and zero otherwise (Source: E&Y Worldwide Corporate Tax 
Guides and the PwC Worldwide Tax Summaries) 
Tonly_TransferPricing An indicator variable set equal to one if the target (i) country has 
specific transfer pricing regulations and the acquirer (j) country 
does not, and zero otherwise (Source: E&Y Worldwide Corporate Tax 
Guides and the PwC Worldwide Tax Summaries) 
FTC An indicator variable set equal to one if the country allows a 
foreign tax credit for foreign taxes paid on non-exempt foreign 
profits, and zero otherwise (Source: E&Y Worldwide Corporate Tax 
Guides and the PwC Worldwide Tax Summaries) 
Tonly_FTC An indicator variable set equal to one if the acquirer (j) country 




foreign profits and the target (i) country does not, and zero 
otherwise (Source: E&Y Worldwide Corporate Tax Guides and the 
PwC Worldwide Tax Summaries) 
Aonly_FTC An indicator variable set equal to one if the target (i) country allows 
a foreign tax credit for foreign taxes paid on non-exempt foreign 
profits and the acquirer (j) country does not, and zero otherwise 
(Source: E&Y Worldwide Corporate Tax Guides and the PwC 
Worldwide Tax Summaries) 
IPBox An indicator variable set equal to one if the country exempts all or a 
portion of income derived from qualifying intellectual property or 
taxes this income at a reduced tax rate, and zero otherwise (Source: 
E&Y Worldwide Corporate Tax Guides and the PwC Worldwide Tax 
Summaries) 
Aonly_IPBox An indicator variable set equal to one if the acquirer (j) country 
exempts all or a portion of income derived from qualifying 
intellectual property or taxes this income at a reduced tax rate and 
the target (i) country does not, and zero otherwise (Source: E&Y 
Worldwide Corporate Tax Guides and the PwC Worldwide Tax 
Summaries) 
Tonly_IPBox An indicator variable set equal to one if the target (i) country 
exempts all or a portion of income derived from qualifying 
intellectual property or taxes this income at a reduced tax rate and 
the acquirer (j) country does not, and zero otherwise (Source: E&Y 
Worldwide Corporate Tax Guides and the PwC Worldwide Tax 
Summaries) 
Xrate The annual real stock market return of value-weighted index (Source: 
Datastream) 
Diff_Xrate The difference between the annual real stock market return of value-
weighted indices in the acquirer (j) and target (i) countries.  Value-
weighted return indices in local currency (Source: Datastream) are 
deflated by the 2010 consumer price index in each country (Source: 
Worldbank) 
RealRI The annual real bilateral U.S. dollar exchange rate return (Source: 
Datastream) 
Diff_RealRI The difference between the annual real bilateral U.S. dollar exchange 
rate return of the acquirer (j) and target (i) countries.  Nominal exchange 
rates (Source: Datastream) are deflated by the 2010 consumer price 
index in each country (Source: Worldbank) 
DisclosureIndex The country’s value in the Disclosure Index, in which a 10 indicates the 
highest level of disclosure and a zero indicates the lowest level of 




Diff_DisclosureIndex The difference between the acquirer (j) and target (i) countries in the 
Disclosure Index, in which a 10 indicates the highest level of disclosure 
and a zero indicates the lowest level of disclosure (Source: WorldBank) 
Anti_SelfDeal The Anti-Self Dealing Index, in which a 1 indicates good governance 
and zero indicates a low level of governance (Source: Djankov, La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2008) 
Diff_Anti_SelfDeal The difference between the acquirer (j) and target (i) countries in the 
Anti-Self Dealing Index, in which a 1 indicates good governance and 
zero indicates a low level of governance (Source: Djankov, La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2008) 
SameLanguage An indicator variable equal to one if the acquirer (j) and target (i) 
countries share a primary language, and zero otherwise (Source: FBI 
World Factbook) 
SameReligion An indicator variable equal to one if the acquirer (j) and target (i) 
countries share a primary religion, and zero otherwise (Source: FBI 
World Factbook) 
GCDist The great circle distance between the capital cities of the acquirer (j) and 
target (i) countries, calculated using he longitude and latitude of capital 
cities (Source: www.WorldData.info) 
MaxTrade The maximum of bilateral imports and exports between acquirer (j) and 
target (i) countries, where imports (exports) are measured as the total 
proportion of the target country’s imports (exports) from (to) the acquirer 
country (Source: UN Commodity Trade Database) 
GDP The natural log of the per capita GDP (Source: WorldBank) 
Diff_GDP The difference in the natural log of the per capita GDP (Source: 
WorldBank) 
GDPgrowth Tthe annual growth of the per capita GDP (Source: WorldBank) 
Diff_GDPgrowth The difference in the annual growth of the per capita GDP (Source: 
WorldBank) 
Premia The four-week merger premia, calculated as the difference 
between the initial bid price and the share price four weeks prior to 
the day of the initial bid, scaled by the price four weeks prior to the 
day of the initial bid (Source: Security Data Corporation’s (SDC) 
Mergers and Corporate Transactions database) 
SameIndustry An indicator variable equal to one if the acquirer firm and the 
target firm have the same two-digit SIC number, and zero 
otherwise (Source: Security Data Corporation’s (SDC) Mergers and 
Corporate Transactions database) 
Gov_Involvement An indicator variable equal to one if there is government 
involvement in the M&A, and zero otherwise (Source: Security Data 




Unsolicited An indicator variable equal to one if bid was unsolicited, and zero 
otherwise (Source: Security Data Corporation’s (SDC) Mergers and 
Corporate Transactions database) 
BigN An indicator variable equal to one if the auditor is KPMG, PwC, 
E&Y or Deloitte, and zero otherwise (Source: Security Data 
Corporation’s (SDC) Mergers and Corporate Transactions database) 
Private An indicator variable equal to one if the acquirer firm is taking the 
target private through the M&A, and zero otherwise. (Source: 
Security Data Corporation’s (SDC) Mergers and Corporate Transactions 
database) 
Size The natural log of the deal value in millions (Source: Security Data 
Corporation’s (SDC) Mergers and Corporate Transactions database) 
CompetingBid An indicator variable equal to one if the number of bidders for the 
target firm exceeds one, and zero otherwise (Source: Security Data 
Corporation’s (SDC) Mergers and Corporate Transactions database) 
ToeHold The percentage of the target owned by the acquirer prior to the 
deal announcement (Source: Security Data Corporation’s (SDC) 




11. Appendix 2: Erel et. al (2012) Replication 
 
 In my primary analysis, I deviate from the dependent variable used in Erel et al. (2012) in 
order to separately examine the effect of tax system characteristics on both the volume and the 
direction of cross-border M&A.  In this appendix, I use the dependent variable from Erel et al. 
(2012) to jointly consider these effects.  Descriptive statistics for all variables in this test can be 
found in Table 2.  Of note is that the dependent variable used in Erel et al. (2012) and in these 
regressions is highly right-skewed.  Though this skewness is due to the pattern of M&A itself, 
and is similar to the skewness of MaxTrade, another measure of cross-border activity, I urge the 
reader to interpret the results of OLS regression with this dependent variable with extreme 
caution.  While skewness in the dependent variable does not violate OLS assumptions, it does 
make OLS regression, which models the mean of the distribution, less appropriate. 
INSERT APPENDIX 2 TABLE HERE 
 Similar to Erel et al. (2012), I also find that acquirers more frequently acquire in 
countries with lower statutory tax rates.  I also find evidence that firms acquire targets in 
countries with a lower dividend withholding tax rates, reducing the cost of repatriating the profits 
of the foreign subsidiary.   
 Contrary to expectations, I find that cross-border M&As occur more (less) frequently 
between an acquirer (target) subject to CFC provisions and a target (acquirer) that is not than 
between two firms with similar treatment of income from controlled foreign subsidiaries.  
Although CFC provisions increase the tax cost of operating a foreign subsidiary, this result 
suggests that the applicability of CFC provisions does not deter, but rather encourages, cross-
border M&A.  This is not consistent with my findings in Tables 3 and 5 above.   
 
52 
I find that cross-border M&As occur less (more) frequently between an acquirer (target) 
subject to transfer pricing regulations and a target (acquirer) that is not than between two firms 
with similar anti-avoidance regimes.   This is consistent with transfer pricing regulations 
reducing the profitability of cross-border M&A by limiting the post-merger firms’ ability to 
avoid taxes through income shifting, provided that post-merger firms, on average, prefer to shift 
income away from the acquirer. 
Finally, I also find that cross-border M&A is more likely when only the target firm is in 
an IP Box regime.  This would be consistent with firms acquiring targets in a favorable regime to 
facilitate moving IP to a tax-preferred jurisdiction. 
Across known non-tax determinants of the volume of cross-border M&As, my results are 
largely consistent with prior literature.  Consistent with Erel et al. (2012), I find that geographic 
distance, existing trade, and cultural similarity are important determinants of cross-border 
M&As.  I also find evidence that acquirers are likely to acquire in countries with poorer 
governance and lower GDP per capita.  In my sample, however, I do not find that firms exploit 







Table 1: Number of Mergers by Country Pair 
Table 1 presents the number of M&A transactions occurring between 2006 and 2015, inclusive.  The columns represent the countries of 
the acquirers, while the rows represent the countries of the targets.  Therefore, the diagonal entries of the matrix represent the domestic 
mergers that occurred within the country, while the off-diagonal entries are the number of deals between an ordered country pair. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) 
(1) Australia 7686 13 9 13 0 230 0 0 1 11 0 0 16 68 80 1 0 69 22 32 3 19 0 185 0 
(2) Austria 7 613 6 2 0 7 0 0 3 5 0 0 7 25 220 0 1 5 0 3 5 29 0 14 0 
(3) Belgium 28 13 749 4 0 28 1 0 0 8 0 5 9 230 90 2 0 13 0 25 3 12 0 23 0 
(4) Brazil 39 9 16 2217 0 108 29 13 0 11 0 0 8 153 74 0 1 18 0 14 19 68 1 84 0 
(5) Bulgaria 0 18 3 0 176 1 0 0 4 0 0 0 3 12 15 17 1 1 0 4 1 6 0 1 0 
(6) Canada 139 11 43 17 0 9235 5 6 0 22 0 1 14 146 56 2 2 49 6 25 40 18 0 86 1 
(7) Chile 19 2 2 8 0 39 498 7 0 2 0 0 1 8 12 0 0 4 0 1 0 5 0 14 0 
(8) Colombia 4 0 2 21 0 71 16 208 0 3 0 0 0 22 4 0 0 4 0 3 0 3 0 7 0 
(9) Czech Republic 4 31 9 1 0 7 0 0 420 8 0 0 11 52 80 2 5 12 0 5 10 14 0 14 0 
(10) Denmark 8 6 11 1 1 12 2 0 0 1132 0 1 42 47 74 1 0 4 1 9 4 13 0 20 0 
(11) Ecuador 4 0 0 0 0 9 0 8 0 0 14 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
(12) Egypt 3 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 1 0 234 0 9 5 3 0 7 0 0 0 3 0 5 0 
(13) Finland 9 4 7 0 0 28 0 2 0 47 0 0 1053 17 50 0 0 11 0 4 2 8 0 15 0 
(14) France 32 20 207 5 0 97 3 0 3 33 0 3 17 10009 296 2 2 40 1 25 24 147 0 99 0 
(15) Germany 56 269 62 5 2 88 0 0 17 75 0 3 56 356 6492 9 3 72 1 36 36 142 0 154 0 
(16) Greece 2 2 8 0 0 5 1 0 0 3 0 0 4 14 15 361 0 2 0 2 2 5 0 3 0 
(17) Hungary 2 22 5 0 0 2 0 0 8 3 0 0 4 27 54 0 128 1 0 2 3 4 0 9 0 
(18) India 35 11 13 3 0 35 0 0 0 12 0 2 9 113 119 1 1 4087 1 8 3 32 0 184 0 
(19) Indonesia 59 0 1 0 0 10 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 10 9 0 0 16 731 1 0 2 0 77 0 
(20) Ireland-Rep 11 4 3 1 0 23 0 0 0 3 0 1 1 33 23 0 0 3 0 467 1 7 0 8 0 
(21) Israel 4 0 4 1 0 27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 10 0 0 9 0 6 339 5 0 5 0 
(22) Italy 14 51 29 5 1 27 0 0 3 15 0 3 16 237 170 5 3 39 1 8 9 2651 0 57 0 
(23) Jamaica 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 0 
(24) Japan 19 0 4 3 0 14 0 0 0 2 0 0 5 43 63 2 0 11 1 5 5 14 8 15895 0 
(25) Kenya 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 26 
(26) Luxembourg 5 1 27 0 0 6 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 35 24 0 0 2 0 4 0 13 0 8 0 
(27) Malaysia 42 0 1 0 0 11 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 13 16 0 0 14 14 2 0 3 0 98 0 
(28) Mexico 22 1 4 15 0 241 3 8 0 4 0 0 2 18 22 0 0 9 0 4 3 8 0 18 0 
(29) Netherlands 17 28 121 7 0 29 0 1 3 20 0 0 28 154 196 2 3 27 0 37 17 31 1 55 0 
(30) New Zealand 316 0 2 0 0 37 0 0 0 4 0 0 1 10 17 0 0 6 1 0 5 3 0 31 0 
(31) Norway 3 10 4 3 0 27 0 0 1 102 0 0 52 38 58 5 1 9 1 4 2 5 0 13 0 
(32) Pakistan 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 
(33) Peru 22 1 4 15 0 114 30 13 0 2 1 0 0 3 3 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 7 0 
(34) Philippines 27 1 1 0 0 9 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 3 1 1 0 0 0 39 0 
(35) Poland 13 29 15 0 0 10 0 0 9 17 0 1 19 67 117 5 4 8 0 4 8 24 0 13 0 
(36) Portugal 3 1 5 16 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 36 14 0 2 3 0 2 0 5 0 8 0 
(37) Romania 1 28 6 0 2 3 0 0 5 1 0 0 3 29 19 19 12 4 0 3 5 14 0 5 0 
(38) Russian Fed 7 25 14 0 2 33 0 0 8 13 0 0 69 70 120 3 2 6 0 7 8 34 0 34 0 
(39) Singapore 88 3 2 0 0 14 0 0 0 3 0 0 4 28 30 0 0 56 33 8 1 13 0 125 0 
(40) Slovak Rep 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 14 2 0 0 3 7 8 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 
(41) S Korea 16 1 5 0 0 10 0 0 0 5 0 0 3 25 31 0 0 5 0 2 3 2 0 127 0 
(42) Spain 24 6 44 10 0 52 8 2 4 21 0 3 26 317 154 7 0 22 1 19 12 98 0 50 0 
(43) Sri Lanka 2 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 10 1 0 0 0 0 7 0 
(44) Sweden 22 9 9 1 0 42 0 0 1 202 0 0 232 69 105 0 0 17 0 12 4 18 0 30 0 
(45) Switzerland 14 42 12 2 0 25 0 0 0 15 0 2 10 124 318 0 1 18 0 10 13 38 0 41 0 
(46) Thailand 14 0 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 7 4 0 0 12 3 0 2 2 0 117 0 
(47) Turkey 7 24 10 4 1 20 0 0 6 2 0 3 4 63 56 8 1 14 0 5 2 26 0 36 0 
(48) U.K. 268 24 71 8 1 341 1 1 3 59 0 3 31 442 344 5 0 174 2 283 35 108 1 189 0 
(49) U.S. 586 62 83 75 4 2684 9 14 6 84 2 7 93 652 616 19 5 383 3 327 221 176 2 982 0 





Table 1 (continued): Number of Mergers by Country Pair 
 (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) (45) (46) (47) (48) (49) (50) 
(1) Australia 16 95 2 73 161 20 0 0 13 1 2 0 2 234 0 28 19 0 28 84 27 0 477 977 0 
(2) Austria 15 0 3 23 0 3 0 0 0 7 2 1 11 0 1 1 1 0 14 74 0 1 42 79 0 
(3) Belgium 33 2 1 175 0 5 0 0 0 1 0 0 6 6 0 3 16 0 32 35 0 1 96 176 0 
(4) Brazil 21 3 40 40 4 15 0 3 0 0 46 0 9 16 0 7 89 0 25 80 2 0 130 654 2 
(5) Bulgaria 10 0 1 7 0 2 0 0 1 4 0 3 9 0 0 0 0 0 9 9 0 0 23 34 0 
(6) Canada 19 14 18 74 6 22 1 7 5 6 2 0 21 22 0 32 14 1 43 80 4 1 316 2423 1 
(7) Chile 1 0 4 2 0 1 0 22 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 25 0 7 4 0 0 17 66 1 
(8) Colombia 2 1 24 3 0 1 0 16 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 32 0 5 10 0 0 28 93 3 
(9) Czech Republic 29 0 2 59 0 1 0 0 1 25 2 1 15 1 12 5 12 0 19 23 0 0 72 79 0 
(10) Denmark 7 1 1 54 1 130 0 0 1 6 1 0 5 7 1 2 3 0 231 27 2 0 117 167 0 
(11) Ecuador 0 0 4 1 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 1 
(12) Egypt 0 1 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 2 1 0 0 22 29 0 
(13) Finland 5 0 0 35 0 37 0 0 0 1 1 0 13 3 0 1 9 0 246 9 0 0 135 107 0 
(14) France 103 1 1 145 4 25 1 0 0 5 12 0 17 15 0 12 132 0 94 192 6 4 457 822 0 
(15) Germany 90 17 8 279 9 48 0 0 1 38 13 1 44 25 1 31 72 0 160 470 7 13 577 1187 0 
(16) Greece 4 0 0 5 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 6 0 0 1 1 0 3 5 0 2 28 18 0 
(17) Hungary 0 0 0 18 0 2 0 0 0 10 0 3 2 1 2 0 0 0 5 13 3 2 33 35 0 
(18) India 15 55 2 33 0 18 0 0 2 3 3 0 7 129 2 14 17 6 26 58 5 1 215 837 0 
(19) Indonesia 3 103 1 12 0 2 0 0 7 0 0 1 1 207 0 37 3 0 1 8 24 3 51 44 0 
(20) Ireland-Rep 10 0 3 23 3 3 0 0 1 1 2 0 5 7 1 0 5 0 11 14 2 1 228 248 0 
(21) Israel 6 1 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 3 0 2 2 0 4 9 0 1 27 239 0 
(22) Italy 80 3 1 77 1 3 1 1 0 4 3 4 26 9 0 12 68 0 32 106 5 7 228 400 0 
(23) Jamaica 0 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
(24) Japan 3 10 0 24 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 102 1 83 3 0 17 29 12 1 65 526 0 
(25) Kenya 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 
(26) Luxembourg 41 1 3 10 0 1 0 0 0 4 1 0 2 5 0 5 3 0 9 15 0 0 36 48 0 
(27) Malaysia 4 3903 1 10 1 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 3 320 0 15 2 2 3 11 10 1 35 64 0 
(28) Mexico 3 1 462 15 1 2 0 1 3 0 2 0 0 3 0 4 54 0 7 9 0 0 35 276 1 
(29) Netherlands 32 7 2 2221 5 34 0 0 0 4 2 2 22 18 0 8 33 0 74 60 1 6 252 520 1 
(30) New Zealand 4 12 0 15 902 1 0 0 2 0 1 0 2 40 0 3 3 0 3 10 3 0 48 146 0 
(31) Norway 12 2 2 40 0 1785 0 0 0 8 1 0 3 23 0 8 6 0 327 18 5 1 145 185 0 
(32) Pakistan 0 3 0 4 0 0 45 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 7 8 0 
(33) Peru 0 0 12 5 0 1 0 253 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 3 29 0 1 4 0 0 11 45 0 
(34) Philippines 0 15 2 7 0 0 0 0 427 1 0 0 1 36 0 8 0 0 0 2 8 0 10 36 0 
(35) Poland 37 2 1 50 0 5 0 0 0 1419 4 2 5 2 3 3 14 0 37 23 1 0 124 160 0 
(36) Portugal 12 0 0 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 449 0 1 0 0 0 78 0 4 11 2 2 42 38 0 
(37) Romania 2 0 0 23 0 1 0 0 0 18 2 134 6 0 3 2 8 0 6 16 0 4 32 47 0 
(38) Russian Fed 35 0 1 149 2 17 0 0 0 24 0 0 10381 7 1 13 11 0 45 71 1 13 135 179 1 
(39) Singapore 3 225 0 12 2 13 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 1536 0 11 4 1 9 15 24 0 88 166 0 
(40) Slovak Rep 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 1 0 29 3 0 0 3 2 0 0 6 7 0 
(41) S Korea 3 9 2 12 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 40 0 6339 1 0 15 17 1 0 42 202 0 
(42) Spain 42 4 43 89 1 26 0 1 2 11 77 0 9 8 0 6 4432 0 55 80 1 2 318 421 0 
(43) Sri Lanka 0 16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 159 0 0 1 0 13 3 0 
(44) Sweden 18 2 0 123 1 351 0 0 0 5 1 0 7 3 0 3 7 0 3578 52 0 2 241 307 0 
(45) Switzerland 22 5 0 40 1 10 0 0 2 7 1 0 24 14 0 5 9 0 46 1980 0 2 114 269 0 
(46) Thailand 0 63 0 5 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 91 0 9 0 1 2 6 1039 0 21 43 0 
(47) Turkey 9 10 1 38 0 2 1 0 0 9 4 0 15 12 0 5 19 0 22 26 3 759 68 100 0 
(48) U.K. 56 49 4 244 22 69 2 2 13 8 10 0 47 87 1 19 75 0 183 180 31 1 12458 2781 1 
(49) U.S. 78 29 105 327 48 94 2 6 36 8 6 0 71 122 0 160 150 3 284 422 19 10 1972 57205 2 





Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the ordered country pair year analyses.  All variables 
are as defined in Appendix A. 
 
Country pair Observation Sample Descriptives     
      Standard       
Variable N Mean Deviation p(25) Median p(75) 
CBMA_Volume 21,754 0.289 0.713 0.000 0.000 0.216 
CBMA_Direction 10,454 49.744 39.434 0.000 50.000 100.000 
CBMA_Intermediary 7,600 0.774 0.313 0.667 0.925 1.000 
CBMA_Control 7,600 0.113 0.244 0.000 0.000 0.100 
CBMA_ErelRep 21,754 1.573 4.341 0.000 0.000 0.641 
Diff_Trate_CorpIncTax 21,754 0.088 8.676 -6.000 0.000 6.000 
Diff_Trate_Dividends 21,754 3.915 15.780 -10.000 5.000 15.000 
Aww_Tterr 21,754 0.226 0.418 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Aterr_Tww 21,754 0.222 0.415 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Aonly_CFC 21,754 0.221 0.415 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Tonly_CFC 21,754 0.231 0.421 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Aonly_ThinCap 21,754 0.244 0.429 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Tonly_ThinCap 21,754 0.244 0.430 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Aonly_TP 21,754 0.147 0.354 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Tonly_TP 21,754 0.154 0.361 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Tonly_FTC 21,754 0.190 0.392 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Aonly_FTC 21,754 0.171 0.376 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Tonly_IPBox 21,754 0.121 0.326 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Aonly_IPBox 21,754 0.117 0.321 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Diff_Xrate 21,754 0.000 0.101 -0.059 0.000 0.059 
Diff_RealRI 21,754 -0.001 0.252 -0.156 -0.001 0.154 
Diff_DisclosureIndex 21,754 -0.094 3.676 -3.000 0.000 2.000 
Diff_Anti_SelfDeal 21,754 -0.006 0.327 -0.224 -0.004 0.211 
MaxTrade 21,754 0.019 0.034 0.002 0.006 0.019 
Diff_GDP 21,754 -0.047 1.683 -1.229 -0.038 1.120 
Diff_GDPgrowth 21,754 0.002 3.572 -2.192 0.012 2.203 
GCDist 21,754 7.216 5.035 2.298 7.496 10.298 
SameReligion 21,754 0.606 0.489 0.000 1.000 1.000 




Table 3: Determinants of Volume of Cross-Border M&A 
Table 3 presents the results of the Ordinary Least Squares Regression of model (1) using 
CBMA_Volume as the dependent variable.  Fixed effects are suppressed for brevity.  All variables 
are defined in Appendix A.  P-values are presented in parentheses in Column (2). *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively (based on two-tailed tests).  
 
Panel A 
 Pred. (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Sign Coefficient p-value 
     
Diff_Trate_CorpIncTax + 0.003** (0.020) 
Trate_Dividends - -0.003*** (0.001) 
Aww_Tterr - -0.016 (0.518) 
Aterr_Tww + 0.000 (1.000) 
Aonly_CFC - -0.227*** (0.000) 
Tonly_CFC + 0.002 (0.911) 
Aonly_ThinCap ? 0.022 (0.340) 
Tonly_ThinCap ? -0.010 (0.679) 
Aonly_TP ? -0.149*** (0.000) 
Tonly_TP ? 0.004 (0.869) 
Tonly_FTC - -0.027 (0.487) 
Aonly_FTC + -0.002 (0.946) 
Tonly_IPBox ? -0.029 (0.223) 
Aonly_IPBox ? -0.064 (0.120) 
Diff_Xrate + 0.035 (0.196) 
Diff_RealRI - -0.008 (0.583) 
Diff_DisclosureIndex + -0.011** (0.024) 
Diff_Anti_SelfDeal - 0.055 (0.410) 
MaxTrade + 8.415*** (0.000) 
Diff_GDP + -0.010 (0.290) 
Diff_GDPgrowth - -0.005*** (0.000) 
GCDist - -0.021*** (0.000) 
SameReligion + 0.078*** (0.001) 
SameLanguage + 0.691*** (0.000) 
    
Observations  21,754 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.342 
Year Fixed Effects  YES 
Acquirer Country Fixed Effects YES 





Table 3: Determinants of Volume of Cross-Border M&A (cont.) 
Panel B 
VARIABLES  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Diff_Trate_CorpIncTax + 0.002 0.003* 0.002 0.003* 0.002 0.002 
  (0.236) (0.062) (0.223) (0.062) (0.239) (0.249) 
Trate_Dividends - -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
  (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
Aww_Tterr - -0.016      
  (0.460)      
Aterr_Tww + -0.018      
  (0.528)      
Aonly_CFC -  -0.240***     
   (0.000)     
Tonly_CFC +  0.009     
   (0.681)     
Aonly_ThinCap ?   -0.001    
    (0.979)    
Tonly_ThinCap ?   0.007    
    (0.789)    
Aonly_TP ?    -0.162***   
     (0.000)   
Tonly_TP ?    0.006   
     (0.803)   
Tonly_FTC -     -0.015  
      (0.710)  
Aonly_FTC +     -0.032  
      (0.178)  





       (0.427) 
Aonly_IPBox ?      -0.071* 
       (0.084) 
Diff_Xrate + 0.051* 0.039 0.051* 0.047* 0.053** 0.051* 
  (0.055) (0.142) (0.051) (0.076) (0.048) (0.053) 
Diff_RealRI - -0.004 -0.008 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 
  (0.785) (0.533) (0.779) (0.819) (0.801) (0.771) 
Diff_DisclosureIndex + -0.012** -0.010** -0.012** -0.013** -0.011** -0.012** 
  (0.014) (0.041) (0.014) (0.011) (0.022) (0.013) 
Diff_Anti_SelfDeal - 0.043 0.038 0.044 0.048 0.034 0.048 
  (0.511) (0.552) (0.508) (0.461) (0.592) (0.466) 
MaxTrade + 8.601*** 8.477*** 8.629*** 8.620*** 8.613*** 8.582*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Diff_GDP + -0.026*** -0.017* -0.026*** -0.015 -0.026*** -0.027*** 
  (0.007) (0.056) (0.005) (0.130) (0.005) (0.005) 
Diff_GDPgrowth - -0.003** -0.005*** -0.003** -0.004*** -0.003** -0.003** 
  (0.024) (0.000) (0.023) (0.004) (0.023) (0.019) 
GCDist - -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.021*** -0.022*** -0.021*** -0.020*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SameReligion + 0.084*** 0.063*** 0.084*** 0.099*** 0.085*** 0.084*** 
  (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SameLanguage + 0.679*** 0.690*** 0.680*** 0.679*** 0.681*** 0.681*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
        
Observations  21,754 21,754 21,754 21,754 21,754 21,754 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.334 0.342 0.334 0.340 0.334 0.334 
Year Fixed Effects  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Acquirer Country Fixed Effects  YES YES YES YES YES YES 




Table 4: Determinants of Volume of Cross-Border M&A by Acquirer Country Tax Regime 
Table 4 presents the results of the Ordinary Least Squares Regression of model (1) using 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression, where each observation is an ordered country pair year.  Column 
(1) includes all observations in which the acquirer country is worldwide, while Column (2) 
includes all observations in which the acquirer country is territorial.  Column (3) presents t-tests 
of differences across the two specifications.  Fixed effects are suppressed for brevity.  All variables 
are defined in Appendix A.  P-values are presented in parentheses below each coefficient. *, **, 
and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively (based on two-tailed 
tests).  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Worldwide Territorial  
VARIABLES CBMA_Volumet Difference 
     
Diff_Trate_CorpIncTax 0.002** 0.004*** -0.002 
 (0.049) (0.000) (0.4598) 
Trate_Dividends -0.002 -0.004** 0.002 
 (0.178) (0.013) (0.2872) 
T_WW 0.003 0.011 -0.008 
 (0.824) (0.490) (0.8318) 
Aonly_CFC -0.164*** -0.208*** 0.044 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.6383) 
Tonly_CFC -0.014 0.002 -0.016 
 (0.308) (0.903) (0.6981) 
Aonly_ThinCap 0.017 0.022 -0.005 
 (0.277) (0.163) (0.9052) 
Tonly_ThinCap -0.003 0.014 -0.017 
 (0.824) (0.439) (0.7187) 
Aonly_TP -0.137*** -0.170*** 0.033 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.4520) 
Tonly_TP 0.018 -0.010 0.028 
 (0.387) (0.736) (0.5612) 
Tonly_FTC -0.041 -0.025 -0.016 
 (0.200) (0.320) (0.7931) 
Aonly_FTC -0.004 -0.021 0.017 
 (0.824) (0.274) (0.7161) 
Tonly_IPBox -0.022 -0.022 0.000 
 (0.204) (0.239) (0.9985) 
Aonly_IPBox -0.075 -0.001 -0.074 
 (0.183) (0.966) (0.4266) 
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Diff_Xrate 0.077 -0.019 0.096* 









 (1.000) (0.499) (0.5281) 
Diff_DisclosureIndex -0.006* -0.014*** 0.008 
 (0.056) (0.000) (0.3532) 
Diff_Anti_SelfDeal -0.122*** 0.134*** -0.256** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.0313) 
MaxTrade 4.295*** 10.668*** -6.373*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.0001) 
Diff_GDP 0.018*** -0.018*** -0.036** 
 (0.001) (0.006) (0.0344) 
Diff_GDPgrowth -0.003 -0.007*** 0.004* 
 (0.134) (0.001) (0.0786) 
GCDist -0.022*** -0.020*** -0.002 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.7217) 
SameReligion 0.064*** 0.082*** -0.018 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.7050) 
SameLanguage 0.682*** 0.730*** -0.048 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.8047) 
    
Observations 9,253 12,501  
Adjusted R-Squared 0.275 0.387  
Year Fixed Effects YES YES  
Acquirer Country Fixed Effects YES YES  
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Table 5: Determinants of Direction of Cross-Border M&A 
Table 5 presents the results of the Ordinary Least Squares Regression of model (1) using 
CBMA_Direction as the dependent variable.  Each observation is an ordered country pair year.  
Fixed effects are suppressed for brevity.  All variables are defined in Appendix A.  P-values are 
presented in parentheses in Column (2). *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 
0.01 levels, respectively (based on two-tailed tests).  
 
Panel A 
 Pred. (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Sign Coefficient p-value 
     
Diff_Trate_CorpIncTax + 0.740*** (0.000) 
Diff_Trate_Dividends - -0.246*** (0.000) 
Aww_Tterr - -2.793* (0.061) 
Aterr_Tww + 1.282 (0.336) 
Aonly_CFC - -7.457*** (0.000) 
Tonly_CFC + 7.748*** (0.000) 
Aonly_ThinCap ? -7.557*** (0.000) 
Tonly_ThinCap ? 7.530*** (0.000) 
Aonly_TP ? 3.094** (0.021) 
Tonly_TP ? -2.468 (0.274) 
Tonly_FTC - -2.567 (0.383) 
Aonly_FTC + 3.086** (0.035) 
Tonly_IPBox ? 0.208 (0.863) 
Aonly_IPBox ? 0.000 (1.000) 
Diff_Xrate ? -5.288* (0.096) 
Diff_RealRI ? 4.890*** (0.001) 
Diff_DisclosureIndex ? -1.223*** (0.000) 
Diff_Anti_SelfDeal ? 17.109*** (0.000) 
MaxTrade + 18.556 (0.167) 
Diff_GDP + 12.009*** (0.000) 
Diff_GDPgrowth - 0.167 (0.184) 
    
Observations  10,454 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.377 
Year Fixed Effects  YES 
Acquirer Country Fixed Effects YES 





Table 5: Determinants of Direction of Cross-Border M&A (cont.) 
Panel B 
VARIABLES  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Diff_Trate_CorpIncTax + 0.589*** 0.722*** 0.627*** 0.591*** 0.586*** 0.582*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Diff_Trate_Dividends - -0.266*** -0.289*** -0.232*** -0.265*** -0.266*** -0.260*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Aww_Tterr - -0.196      
  (0.897)      
Aterr_Tww + -1.332      
  (0.316)      
Aonly_CFC -  -7.832***     
   (0.000)     
Tonly_CFC +  8.124***     
   (0.000)     
Aonly_ThinCap ?   -7.217***    
    (0.000)    
Tonly_ThinCap ?   7.469***    
    (0.000)    
Aonly_TP ?    0.250   
     (0.856)   
Tonly_TP ?    -2.130   
     (0.349)   
Tonly_FTC -     2.887  
      (0.308)  
Aonly_FTC +     -2.878**  
      (0.024)  




Tonly_IPBox ?      -1.975 
       (0.121) 
Aonly_IPBox ?      1.272 
       (0.447) 
Diff_Xrate ? -4.302 -5.236* -4.785 -4.066 -4.054 -4.307 
  (0.172) (0.097) (0.129) (0.195) (0.197) (0.171) 
Diff_RealRI ? 5.760*** 5.534*** 5.043*** 5.818*** 5.747*** 5.723*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Diff_DisclosureIndex ? -1.470*** -1.133*** -1.544*** -1.457*** -1.373*** -1.507*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Diff_Anti_SelfDeal ? 20.471*** 18.028*** 19.822*** 20.529*** 20.038*** 21.527*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
MaxTrade + 19.967 21.220 22.430 21.776 23.122* 21.846 
  (0.160) (0.117) (0.103) (0.124) (0.099) (0.126) 
Diff_GDP + 11.311*** 12.194*** 11.307*** 11.182*** 11.082*** 11.036*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Diff_GDPgrowth - 0.438*** 0.264** 0.293** 0.450*** 0.435*** 0.456*** 
  (0.000) (0.035) (0.020) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
        
Observations  10,454 10,454 10,454 10,454 10,454 10,454 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.360 0.369 0.370 0.360 0.361 0.361 
Year Fixed Effects  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Acquirer Country Fixed Effects  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust SE Clustered by Country-Pair YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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Table 6: Determinants of Direction of Cross-Border M&A by Acquirer Country Tax 
Regime 
Table 6 presents the results of the Ordinary Least Squares Regression of model (1) using 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression, where each observation is an ordered country pair year.  Column 
(1) includes all observations in which the acquirer country is worldwide, while Column (2) 
includes all observations in which the acquirer country is territorial.  Column (3) presents t-tests 
of differences across the two specifications.  Fixed effects are suppressed for brevity.  All variables 
are defined in Appendix A.  P-values are presented in parentheses below each coefficient. *, **, 
and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively (based on two-tailed 
tests).  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Worldwide Territorial  
VARIABLES CBMA_Directionet Difference 
     
Diff_Trate_CorpIncTax 0.670*** 0.741*** -0.071 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.6559) 
Diff_Trate_Dividends -0.196*** -0.260*** 0.064 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.5423) 
T_WW 3.156** -0.509 3.665 
 (0.023) (0.647) (0.1195) 
Aonly_CFC -8.163*** -7.178*** -0.985 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.7326) 
Tonly_CFC 7.856*** 7.353*** 0.503 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.8474) 
Aonly_ThinCap -7.098*** -7.880*** 0.782 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.7727) 
Tonly_ThinCap 9.474*** 6.174*** 3.3 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.1817) 
Aonly_TP 3.704** 3.098** 0.606 
 (0.048) (0.013) (0.8336) 
Tonly_TP -3.187 -4.247 1.06 
 (0.176) (0.145) (0.8210) 
Tonly_FTC 16.105*** -3.552* 19.657** 
 (0.004) (0.053) (0.0226) 
Aonly_FTC 3.827** 2.518** 1.309 
 (0.017) (0.048) (0.6504) 
Tonly_IPBox -0.457 0.348 -0.805 
 (0.781) (0.773) (0.9336) 
Aonly_IPBox -0.191 0.357 -0.548 
 (0.973) (0.810) (0.7463) 
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Diff_Xrate -2.763 -6.202 3.439 
 (0.584) (0.150) (0.5938) 
Diff_RealRI 2.604 5.994*** -3.39 
 (0.255) (0.003) (0.2665) 
Diff_DisclosureIndex -1.552*** -1.010*** -0.542 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.3717) 
Diff_Anti_SelfDeal 15.844*** 16.637*** -0.793 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.8976) 
MaxTrade -20.272 39.435*** -59.707** 
 (0.215) (0.001) (0.0242) 
Diff_GDP 11.456*** 12.875*** -1.419 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.2442) 
Diff_GDPgrowth 0.339* 0.006 0.333 
 (0.085) (0.971) (0.1959) 
    
Observations 3,967 6,487  
Adjusted R-Squared 0.362 0.378  
Year Fixed Effects YES YES  




Table 7: Descriptive Statistics 
Table 7 presents the descriptive statistics for the country year analyses.  All variables are as defined 
in Appendix A. 
 
Country year Observation Sample Descriptives     
      Standard       
Variable N Mean Deviation p(25) Median p(75) 
CL_TVolume 469.000 1.366 1.646 0.535 0.830 1.471 
CL_AVolume 469.000 1.139 3.221 0.267 0.486 0.875 
CL_Direction 469.000 0.392 0.196 0.221 0.403 0.554 
Trate_CorpIncTax 469.000 25.089 6.166 20.000 25.000 30.000 
WW 469.000 0.469 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000 
CFC 469.000 0.333 0.472 0.000 0.000 1.000 
ThinCap 469.000 0.497 0.501 0.000 0.000 1.000 
TP 469.000 0.821 0.384 1.000 1.000 1.000 
FTC 469.000 0.774 0.419 1.000 1.000 1.000 
IPBox 469.000 0.136 0.344 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Xrate 469.000 0.003 0.098 -0.061 0.011 0.064 
RealRI 469.000 0.092 0.267 -0.041 0.109 0.251 
DisclosureIndex 469.000 6.533 2.613 5.000 7.000 8.000 
Anti_SelfDeal 469.000 0.467 0.231 0.283 0.429 0.642 
GDP 469.000 9.749 1.202 8.964 10.034 10.746 




Table 8: Determinants of Volume of Cross-Border M&A 
Table 8 presents the results of the Ordinary Least Squares Regression of model (3) using 
CL_TVolume as the dependent variable.  Each observation is a country year.  Fixed effects are 
suppressed for brevity.  All variables are defined in Appendix A.  P-values are presented in 
parentheses in Column (2). *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, 
respectively (based on two-tailed tests).  
 
Panel A: Target Perspective 
 Pred. (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Sign Coefficient p-value 
     
Trate_CorpIncTax - -0.007** (0.012) 
WW + 0.076 (0.109) 
CFC ? -0.014 (0.800) 
ThinCap ? 0.058 (0.135) 
TP ? -0.042 (0.366) 
FTC - -0.114* (0.072) 
IPBox ? 0.111* (0.086) 
Xrate ? 0.003 (0.974) 
RealRI ? 0.038 (0.347) 
DisclosureIndex ? 0.011 (0.324) 
Anti_SelfDeal ? -0.225* (0.095) 
GDP - -0.021 (0.366) 
GDPgrowth + 0.001 (0.858) 
    
Observations  469 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.203 
Year Fixed Effects  YES 
Country Fixed Effects NO 
Robust SE Clustered by Country YES 
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Table 8: Determinants of Volume of Cross-Border M&A (cont.) 
Table 8 presents the results of the Ordinary Least Squares Regression of model (3) using 
CL_AVolume as the dependent variable.  Each observation is a country year.  Fixed effects are 
suppressed for brevity.  All variables are defined in Appendix A.  P-values are presented in 
parentheses in Column (2). *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, 
respectively (based on two-tailed tests).  
 
Panel B: Acquirer Perspective 
 Pred. (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Sign Coefficient p-value 
     
Trate_CorpIncTax + 0.001 (0.572) 
WW - 0.047 (0.297) 
CFC - -0.103** (0.022) 
ThinCap ? -0.025 (0.467) 
TP ? -0.024 (0.627) 
FTC + -0.077 (0.137) 
IPBox ? 0.077 (0.174) 
Xrate + 0.140 (0.205) 
RealRI + 0.072* (0.089) 
DisclosureIndex ? -0.007 (0.516) 
Anti_SelfDeal ? -0.013 (0.914) 
GDP + 0.088*** (0.000) 
GDPgrowth - -0.003 (0.584) 
    
Observations  469 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.256 
Year Fixed Effects  YES 
Country Fixed Effects NO 
Robust SE Clustered by Country YES 
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Table 9: Determinants of Direction of Cross-Border M&A 
Table 9 presents the results of the Ordinary Least Squares Regression of model (3) using 
CL_Direction as the dependent variable.  Each observation is a country year.  Fixed effects are 
suppressed for brevity.  All variables are defined in Appendix A.  P-values are presented in 
parentheses in Column (2). *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, 
respectively (based on two-tailed tests).  
 
 Pred. (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Sign Coefficient p-value 
     
Trate_CorpIncTax + 0.008*** (0.004) 
WW - -0.004 (0.903) 
CFC - -0.104*** (0.004) 
ThinCap ? -0.061** (0.046) 
TP ? 0.025 (0.469) 
FTC + 0.016 (0.709) 
IPBox ? -0.005 (0.896) 
Xrate + 0.143 (0.268) 
RealRI + 0.035 (0.301) 
DisclosureIndex ? -0.012 (0.196) 
Anti_SelfDeal ? 0.164* (0.095) 
GDP + 0.119*** (0.000) 
GDPgrowth - -0.001 (0.620) 
    
Observations  469 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.528 
Year Fixed Effects  YES 
Country Fixed Effects NO 




Table 10: Determinants of Obtaining Control in Cross-Border M&A 
Table 10 presents the results of the Ordinary Least Squares Regression of model (2) using 
CBMA_Control as the dependent variable.  Each observation is an ordered country pair year.  Fixed 
effects are suppressed for brevity.  All variables are defined in Appendix A.  P-values are presented 
in parentheses in Column (2).  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 
levels, respectively (based on two-tailed tests).  
 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES  Coefficient p-value 
     
Diff_Trate_CorpIncTax  0.001** (0.050) 
Diff_Trate_Dividends  -0.000 (0.517) 
Aww_Tterr  -0.001 (0.946) 
Aterr_Tww  -0.015 (0.223) 
Aonly_CFC  -0.042*** (0.001) 
Tonly_CFC  0.047*** (0.000) 
Aonly_ThinCap  -0.011 (0.358) 
Tonly_ThinCap  0.029*** (0.010) 
Aonly_TP  -0.018 (0.183) 
Tonly_TP  -0.014 (0.643) 
Tonly_FTC  -0.030 (0.219) 
Aonly_FTC  0.039*** (0.003) 
Tonly_IPBox  0.019 (0.134) 
Aonly_IPBox  -0.012 (0.411) 
Diff_Xrate  0.001 (0.970) 
Diff_RealRI  0.004 (0.836) 
Diff_DisclosureIndex  0.000 (0.972) 
Diff_Anti_SelfDeal  -0.011 (0.689) 
MaxTrade  -0.134 (0.252) 
Diff_GDP  -0.019*** (0.000) 
Diff_GDPgrowth  -0.000 (0.819) 
GCDist  -0.002 (0.141) 
SameReligion  0.029* (0.051) 
SameLanguage  0.023 (0.190) 
    
Observations  7,600 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.060 
Year Fixed Effects  YES 
Acquirer Country Fixed Effects YES 
Robust SE Clustered by Country YES 
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Table 11: Determinants of the use of an Intermediary in Cross-Border M&A 
Table 11 presents the results of the Ordinary Least Squares Regression of model (2) using 
CBMA_Intermediary as the dependent variable.  Each observation is an ordered country pair year.  
Fixed effects are suppressed for brevity.  All variables are defined in Appendix A.  P-values are 
presented in parentheses in Column (2).  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 
0.01 levels, respectively (based on two-tailed tests).  
 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES  Coefficient p-value 
     
Diff_Trate_CorpIncTax  0.000 (0.390) 
Diff_Trate_Dividends  0.000 (0.611) 
Aww_Tterr  0.017 (0.108) 
Aterr_Tww  -0.020** (0.031) 
Aonly_CFC  -0.003 (0.656) 
Tonly_CFC  -0.015 (0.108) 
Aonly_ThinCap  -0.014* (0.094) 
Tonly_ThinCap  -0.001 (0.880) 
Aonly_TP  0.013 (0.210) 
Tonly_TP  -0.010 (0.569) 
Tonly_FTC  -0.022 (0.157) 
Aonly_FTC  0.012 (0.232) 
Tonly_IPBox  -0.003 (0.762) 
Aonly_IPBox  -0.013 (0.266) 
Diff_Xrate  0.009 (0.772) 
Diff_RealRI  0.025* (0.094) 
Diff_DisclosureIndex  -0.001 (0.618) 
Diff_Anti_SelfDeal  0.033 (0.101) 
MaxTrade  -0.487*** (0.000) 
Diff_GDP  0.017*** (0.000) 
Diff_GDPgrowth  0.001 (0.231) 
GCDist  0.003*** (0.001) 
SameReligion  -0.029*** (0.005) 
SameLanguage  -0.039*** (0.000) 
    
Observations  7,600 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.053 
Year Fixed Effects  YES 
Acquirer Country Fixed Effects YES 
Robust SE Clustered by Country YES 
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Table 12: Descriptive Statistics 
Table 12 presents the descriptive statistics for the deal-level premia analyses.  All variables are as 
defined in Appendix A.  Premia is shown unlogged for ease of interpretation. 
 
M&A Premia Observation Sample Descriptives     
      Standard       
Variable N Mean Deviation p(25) Median p(75) 
Premia 1,518 42.152 50.581 13.060 28.288 50.160 
Diff_Trate_CorpIncTax 1,518 0.681 10.342 -7.000 0.000 7.880 
Diff_Trate_Dividends 1,518 10.218 15.096 0.000 15.000 20.000 
Aww_Tterr 1,518 0.312 0.463 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Aterr_Tww 1,518 0.267 0.442 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Aonly_CFC 1,518 0.325 0.468 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Tonly_CFC 1,518 0.223 0.417 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Aonly_ThinCap 1,518 0.235 0.424 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Tonly_ThinCap 1,518 0.271 0.444 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Aonly_TP 1,518 0.041 0.198 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Tonly_TP 1,518 0.052 0.222 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Tonly_FTC 1,518 0.134 0.340 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Aonly_FTC 1,518 0.090 0.286 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Tonly_IPBox 1,518 0.066 0.248 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Aonly_IPBox 1,518 0.102 0.303 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Diff_Xrate 1,518 -0.004 0.104 -0.064 0.000 0.059 
Diff_RealRI 1,518 0.015 0.171 -0.075 0.011 0.109 
Diff_DisclosureIndex 1,518 -0.530 2.538 -2.000 -0.400 1.000 
Diff_Anti_SelfDeal 1,518 -0.045 0.264 -0.243 -0.015 0.156 
MaxTrade 1,518 0.125 0.200 0.017 0.048 0.132 
Diff_GDP 1,518 0.233 1.309 -0.204 0.053 0.394 
Diff_GDPgrowth 1,518 -0.253 2.854 -1.498 -0.127 1.035 
GCDist 1,518 6.502 4.976 1.184 6.168 9.559 
SameReligion 1,518 0.688 0.464 0.000 1.000 1.000 
SameLanguage 1,518 0.323 0.468 0.000 0.000 1.000 
SameIndustry 1,518 0.566 0.496 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Gov_Involvement 1,518 0.043 0.203 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Unsolicited 1,518 0.017 0.130 0.000 0.000 0.000 
BigN 1,518 0.030 0.170 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Private 1,518 0.088 0.283 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Size 1,518 4.148 2.310 2.398 4.080 5.769 
CompetingBid 1,518 0.024 0.154 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ToeHold 1,518 10.007 23.439 0.000 0.000 0.100 
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Table 13: Determinants of Merger Premia Cross-Border M&A 
Table 13 presents the results of the Ordinary Least Squares Regression of model (5) using 
Log_Premia as the dependent variable.  Each observation is a M&A transaction.  Fixed effects are 
suppressed for brevity.  All variables are defined in Appendix A.  P-values are presented in 
parentheses in Column (2).  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, 
respectively (based on two-tailed tests).  
 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES  Coefficient p-value 
     
Diff_Trate_CorpIncTax  0.001 (0.861) 
Diff_Trate_Dividends  -0.002 (0.604) 
Aww_Tterr  0.119 (0.193) 
Aterr_Tww  0.226** (0.017) 
Aonly_CFC  -0.009 (0.935) 
Tonly_CFC  0.080 (0.423) 
Aonly_ThinCap  -0.003 (0.980) 
Tonly_ThinCap  0.071 (0.470) 
Aonly_TP  -0.401** (0.043) 
Tonly_TP  0.060 (0.686) 
Tonly_FTC  -0.047 (0.665) 
Aonly_FTC  -0.126 (0.434) 
Tonly_IPBox  0.065 (0.716) 
Aonly_IPBox  -0.004 (0.973) 
Diff_Xrate  0.195 (0.536) 
Diff_RealRI  0.233 (0.300) 
Diff_DisclosureIndex  0.011 (0.644) 
Diff_Anti_SelfDeal  -0.418* (0.089) 
MaxTrade  0.202** (0.036) 
Diff_GDP  -0.160 (0.111) 
Diff_GDPgrowth  -0.005 (0.595) 
GCDist  0.231 (0.443) 
SameReligion  -0.047 (0.205) 
SameLanguage  -0.007 (0.682) 
SameIndustry  0.180*** (0.008) 
Gov_Involvement  -0.275 (0.108) 
Unsolicited  0.501*** (0.002) 
BigN  -0.040 (0.797) 
Private  -0.171 (0.345) 
Size  0.179 (0.106) 
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CompetingBid  0.018 (0.261) 
ToeHold  -0.003* (0.059) 
    
Observations  1,518 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.048 
Year Fixed Effects  YES 
Acquirer Country Fixed Effects YES 
Robust SE Clustered by Country YES 
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Appendix 2: Extension of Erel et al. (2012) 
This table presents the results of the Ordinary Least Squares Regression of model (2) using 
CBMA_Erel as the dependent variable.  Fixed effects are suppressed for brevity.  All variables are 
defined in Appendix A.  P-values are presented in parentheses in Column (2). *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively (based on two-tailed tests).  
 
Panel A 
 Pred. (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Sign Coefficient p-value 
     
Diff_Trate_CorpIncTax + 0.045*** (0.000) 
Diff_Trate_Dividends - -0.018*** (0.000) 
Aww_Tterr - -0.067 (0.587) 
Aterr_Tww + 0.014 (0.927) 
Aonly_CFC - 0.329* (0.090) 
Tonly_CFC + -0.479*** (0.000) 
Aonly_ThinCap ? -0.100 (0.390) 
Tonly_ThinCap ? 0.009 (0.935) 
Aonly_TP ? -0.403*** (0.006) 
Tonly_TP ? 0.183** (0.042) 
Tonly_FTC - -0.151 (0.402) 
Aonly_FTC + 0.034 (0.804) 
Tonly_IPBox ? 0.500*** (0.001) 
Aonly_IPBox ? -0.387 (0.115) 
Diff_Xrate + 0.130 (0.527) 
Diff_RealRI - -0.071 (0.411) 
Diff_DisclosureIndex + -0.087*** (0.002) 
Diff_Anti_SelfDeal - 1.074*** (0.000) 
MaxTrade + 44.443*** (0.000) 
Diff_GDP + 0.183*** (0.002) 
Diff_GDPgrowth - -0.022*** (0.004) 
GCDist + -0.071*** (0.000) 
SameReligion + 0.679*** (0.000) 
SameLanguage + 1.571*** (0.000) 
    
Observations  21,754 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.398 
Year Fixed Effects  YES 
Acquirer Country Fixed Effects YES 





Appendix 2: Extension of Erel et al. (2012) (cont.) 
Panel B 
VARIABLES  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Diff_Trate_CorpIncTax + 0.044*** 0.040*** 0.044*** 0.047*** 0.045*** 0.047*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Diff_Trate_Dividends - -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.018*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Aww_Tterr - -0.026      
  (0.821)      
Aterr_Tww + -0.068      
  (0.640)      
Aonly_CFC -  0.267     
   (0.168)     
Tonly_CFC +  -0.429***     
   (0.000)     
Aonly_ThinCap ?   -0.007    
    (0.954)    
Tonly_ThinCap ?   -0.112    
    (0.304)    
Aonly_TP ?    -0.343**   
     (0.021)   
Tonly_TP ?    0.161*   
     (0.062)   
Tonly_FTC -     -0.283  
      (0.110)  
Aonly_FTC +     0.166  
      (0.162)  
Tonly_IPBox ?      0.463*** 




Aonly_IPBox ?      -0.389 
       (0.114) 
Diff_Xrate + 0.123 0.166 0.124 0.116 0.091 0.104 
  (0.547) (0.413) (0.540) (0.568) (0.655) (0.606) 
Diff_RealRI - -0.075 -0.060 -0.070 -0.076 -0.084 -0.076 
  (0.384) (0.487) (0.414) (0.373) (0.332) (0.375) 
Diff_DisclosureIndex + -0.078*** -0.088*** -0.079*** -0.078*** -0.088*** -0.075*** 
  (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.007) 
Diff_Anti_SelfDeal - 1.145*** 1.195*** 1.168*** 1.150*** 1.243*** 1.038*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
MaxTrade + 44.300*** 44.300*** 44.423*** 44.353*** 44.475*** 44.598*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Diff_GDP + 0.183*** 0.133** 0.179*** 0.206*** 0.179*** 0.210*** 
  (0.001) (0.018) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Diff_GDPgrowth - -0.023*** -0.016** -0.022*** -0.025*** -0.023*** -0.026*** 
  (0.004) (0.036) (0.006) (0.002) (0.005) (0.001) 
GCDist + -0.071*** -0.072*** -0.071*** -0.074*** -0.070*** -0.067*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SameReligion + 0.580*** 0.644*** 0.584*** 0.612*** 0.578*** 0.571*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SameLanguage + 1.582*** 1.574*** 1.596*** 1.583*** 1.591*** 1.607*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
        
Observations  21,754 21,754 21,754 21,754 21,754 21,754 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.394 0.396 0.394 0.395 0.395 0.396 
Year Fixed Effects  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Acquirer Country Fixed Effects  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust SE Clustered by Country-Pair YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
